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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
OF EQUAL POPULATION'*
MAIPULATION of the boundaries of Congressional districts has long been
a favored political device whereby factions in control of state legislatures
secure disproportionately large representation in the national Congress.
1
Knowing the political predilections of each locality, the dominant element
may so tailor the districts that adverse votes will constitute ineffective
minorities throughout the state. If, on the other hand, the strength and
grouping of opposition supporters is such that some districts must in any
event be yielded, the usual practice is to minimize the loss by concentrating
unfriendly voters in a few sacrificial districts. In order to reduce adverse
representation even further, such districts are often drawn to include a much
greater total population than "safe" districts.2 So widespread has been the
use of this latter device that today the largest district in 26 states has from
150% to 800% as many inhabitants as the smallest.3 The aggregate impetus
of such unequal districting inevitably carries beyond the fortunes of candi-
dates and the relative representation of citizens, to shape in some measure
the overall compesiticn of Congress and the legislation enacted.4 As now
* Colegrove v. Green, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198 (U. S. 1946), relicaring deniet, 15 U. S. L. WrEK
3172 (1946).
1. See GasFFITH, THE RIsE AND DEVELOPmEz,-NT OF TrE GERRua DMER (1907).
2. In general usage, districting schemes smacking of political chicanery of any hind
are labeled "gerrymanders," a term reputedly owing its origin to a Massachusetts legislative
district shaped like a salamander under an 1812 statute enacted while Elbridge Gerry vas
governor. Id. at 15-21. The different techniques mentioned may of course be combined in
various ways. For example, under an attempted Minnesota reapportionment in 1931, one
district-containing nearly a hundred thousand more inhabitants than the smallest district
-almost cut the state in two, extending from the South Dakota border eastward to include
a single ward of Minneapolis. See Holm v. Smiley, 184 Minn. 228, 238 N. W. 494 (1931),
rev'd, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Shumate, Mfinnesota's Congressional Election
at Large (1933) 27 Am. POL. Sci. Rnv. 58-9.
3. Since seven states elect all their Congressmen at large, the 26 is out of a total of 41
states. In 14 of the 26 the largest district has more than twice the population of the smallest:
Ark., Calif., Fla-., Ga., Ill., Md., Mich., Miss., Mo., Ohio, Okla., Pa., S. D., and Tex.; the
other 12, in which the largest district is between half again as large and twice as large as the
smallest, are Ala., Colo., Conn., Ind., Kans., Ky., N. J., N. Y., N. C., Ore., Tenn., and
Wash. See 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1202-3 (U. S. 1946); SCWIIIECKEBIER, Co.GRE5sio*LuL Apron-
TioNMENT (1941) 149-92.
4. "We are permitting the streams of legislation to become poisoned at the Eource."
Chafee, Congressional Apportionnnt (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 1015, 6. How much unequal
districting affects national legislation is inevitably speculative since it is impossible to ascer-
tain, e.g., how individual Congressmen have reacted in informal committee votes or voice
votes on the floor, what other Congressmen would otherwise have been elected, and how they
would have voted in Congress. A comment on the Michigan apportionment of 1931 is sug-
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used, it seems generally to favor rural over industrial areas 5 and the Repub-
lican over the Democratic Party;O for the future, it extends a weapon of vast
potential to elements desirous of maintaining the political, economic, or
social status quo.
7
gestive as an example: "... [D]eserves the admiring inspection of politicians. Tie Anti-
Saloon League had a share in . . .its artifices. These include taking so much wet territory
from the districts of two wet representatives, and adding so many dry votes, that the ant-
prohibitionists have little chance of reelection." Editorial, N. Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1931,
p. 18, col. 3.
5. See SCHMECKEBIER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128. Of the 26 states listed in note 3
supra as having especially unequal districting, 23 have at least one city over 100,000 in
population; in 14 of the 23, the largest district contains at least part of the state's largest
city, and in two more the second largest district includes the largest city. Detroit is divided
among six of the seven largest districts in Michigan, and the six average over 100,000 more
inhabitants than the other 11 districts in the state; Detroit legislators are said to have
supported the scheme "because they considered it the best that could be obtained from a
body of 'upstaters'." N. Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1931, p. 18, col. 3. Ohio's five largest districts
include part or all of Cleveland, Akron, Youngstownp Dayton and Columbus. Oklahoma
City and Tulsa are in districts aggregating 35% of Oklahoma's population, yet have only
25% of the state's Congressmen. For discrimination against Chicago, see note 24 infra,
The figures in this note and in note 6 infra were calculated from the CoNG. DiRECTOln,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1945) 3-133 and the WORLD ALMANAC (1946) 455-81.
6. Of the 26 states most unequally districted (see note 3 supra), 15 returned both
Republicans and Democrats in the 1944 election. In 7 of the 15-Cal., Ky., Md., Mo.e,
N. J., Okla., and Tenn.-unequal districting seems to have favored the Democrats, Republi-
can districts averaging 39,302 more inhabitants than Democratic districts. All these states
but N. J. usually have Democratic-controlled legislatures. In the other 8-Conn., Ill., Ind.,
Mich., N. Y., Ohio, Pa., and Wash.-the Republicans have apparently profited, the average
Democratic district having 49,500 more inhabitants than the average Republican district.
Lumping the 15 together, the average district going Democratic in 1944 had 17,916 more
people than the average Republican district. While strongly suggestive, these figures cannot
be given an absolute interpretation since relative party strengths in each district, as weil as
the size of the districts, must enter into evaluation of the political advantages involved.
For example, in Ohio, which the Republican legislature has districted so that the average
Democratic district in 1944 had 113,498 more inhabitants than the average Republican
district, the significance of the overall state figures is enhanced by the fact that the largest
district in the state (22d) is safely Republican; it combines a heavily Democratic section of
Cleveland with enough outlying territory to assure election of a Republican. On the other
hand, in a few exceptional districts-often as a result of historical accident-the minority
party gains from unequal districting. For example, the smallest district in the country
(Ill.'s 5th) is safely Democratic in a state districted by Republicans.
Potentially unequal districting could tip the scales in the selection of a President; should a
third party become established and no candidate receive a majority of the votes in the
Electoral College, the House, each state's delegation exercising a single vote, would choose
the President. U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3. A difference of one vote in a state delegation
could throw the election.
7. It might, for example, be used in Southern states to cushion the impact of recent
decisions upholding the right of Negroes to vote in federal elections. See Smith v. Allwright,
321 U. S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941); Lane v. Wilson, 307
U. S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536
(1927). Unequal districting for the state legislature has been so used in Alabama, FARMER,
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN ALABAMA: LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1944) 13-4.
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Neither the method by which districts shall be laid out, nor, in fact,
whether elections shall be by districts or at large, is specified in the Consti-
tution. That document declares only that Representatives shall be "chosen
by the people",8 that after every census Congress shall reapportion seats
among the states according to population ;9 that, to the enxtent Congress does
8. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The second half of this provision points up the fact that the
relation between total population, on which representation is based (see note 9 infra), and
even potential voting population will vary greatly between states so long as Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, note 9 infra, remains a dead letter.
9. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in
such Manner as they shall by Law direct. . . ." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. "Repre-
sentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State." U.S. Coxsr. AmNDr. XIV, § 2.
The complexities of equalizing representation even among the states seem not to have
been recognized by the framers. Difficulties arose immediately after the census of 1790.
The root of the trouble is that no matter what figures are fixed on for the total size of the
House or the number of persons to be represented by each Congressman, all states almost
inevitably are entitled to fractional representation-such as 3.2 or 10.7 Representatives.
The vital issue has been what to do with the fractions. Washington chose the Apportion-
ment Act of 1792 for the first exercise of the Presidential veto; and after every subsequent
census there has been a dispute over which states should receive additional seats for frac-
tional populations. Five different mathematical methods have been used. The one currently
provided for, the "method of equal proportions," is complicated in exposition but simple in
application and apparently the most equitable in result. 3 ANNALs OF Co. r.mss 539 (1792);
87 CONG. REc. 1071-89, 1123-30, 8050-9, 8076-88 (1941); 55 STAT. 761, 2 U. S. C. § 2(a)
(Supp. 1941); HUNTINGTON, METHODS OF APPORTIONMENT IN CONGRESS, SFnz. Dc. No.
304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); SCMIECKEBIER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3, 107-26, 12-72;
Chafee, lc. dl. supra note 4.
Congress has reapportioned seats, as directed, after every census except that of 1920
when it was unable to agree on a new act. To prevent recurrence of such a lapse, an act of
1929 provided for automatic reapportionment whenever Congress failed to act. 46 STAT. 21
(1929), as amended 55 STAT. 761, 2 U. S. C. § 2(a) (Supp. 1941). Partly because of the diffi-
culty of ascertaining the degree of abridgment of the right of all 21-year old male citizens
to vote, Congress has never reduced a state's representation for that reason. See Co:G.
-GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1871) 66; Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 4th,
1945), cert. denkd, 66 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1946).
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not do so, state legislatures shall prescribe the "times, places, and manner"
of elections ;10 and that the House shall be the judge of the "elections, returns,
and qualifications" of its members."
As a practical matter Congress has always left the states a free hand to
determine the "manner" of Congressional elections. While federal statutes
after 1872 did stipulate that elections be by districts containing as nearly as
practicable the same population,'12 this provision was never enforced, 18 and
was finally abandoned altogether in 1929.14 In the composition of state
10. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
The spectre of local abuses was apparently one of the major factors in inducing the
framers to give Congress this'semi-supervisory power. Madison once hinted at the possl-
bility of unequal'districting. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVrN-
TION oF 1787 (1937) 240-1. But the action generally feared seems to have been that legisla-
tures might either cripple the national government by refusing altogether to provide for
elections or assure desired election results by restricting the balloting places. Ibid.; ThE
FEDERALIST, Nos. 52-61.
11. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
12. In 1842 Congress for the first time required election by districts and directed that
they be of contiguous territory. 5 STAT. 491 (1842). These requirements were dropped in
1850 but reinstated in 1862. 9 STAT. 428, 432-3 (1850); 12 STAT. 572 (1862). There was
added in 1872 the requirement that each district contain "as nearly as practicable an equal
number of inhabitants." Rnv. STAT. § 23 (1875). The same provisions were continued after
the next two censuses, and in 1901 were supplemented by a requirement that districts be
"compact." 22 STAT. 5 (1882); 26 STAT. 735 (1891); 31 STAT. 733 (1901). Reenacted in 1911,
all four requirements lasted at least until the next Reapportionment Act, in 1929. 37 STAT,
13 (1911); 46 STAT. 21 (1929), 2 U. S. C. § 3 (1940).
13. On only two occasions has the requirement been invoked in contests to determine
which candidate should be seated in the House from a particular district. In the first, a
House committee held the Congressional Act inapplicable as being either unconstitutional
or unwise. Davison v. Gilbert (1901), RoWELL, DIGEST OF CONTESTED ELECTION CASES
IN TnE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1789--1901 (1901) 603. In the other, the House took
no action despite a committee recommendation that a Virginia redistricting act should be
held void as violating (1) the U. S. Constitution, (2) the federal statute, and (3) the Virginia
Constitution. Parsons v. Saunders, (1910) MOORES, DIGEST oF CONT.SlrED ELECTION
CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPrSENTATvES 1901-17 (1917) 43.
14. The Reapportionment Act of 1929 did not expressly repeal the "equal population,"
"compact," or "contiguous territory" provisions of the Act of 1911. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), as
amended 55 STAT. 762, 2 U. S. C. § 2(a) (Supp. 1941). Since the main purpose of the 1929
Act was to provide for automatic reapportionment in case Congress again failed to reallocate
seats after any census (see note 9 supra), several courts held that it dealt only with the
number of Representatives each state should have, not with the manner of their election,
which was therefore still covered by the Act of 1911. Moran v. Bowley, 347 I1. 148, 179
N. E. 526 (1932); Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn,
258 N. Y. 292, 179 N. E. 705 (1932), aff'd on other grounds, 285 U. S. 375 (1932); Hume v.
Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky. 1932), rev'd, Mahan v. Hume, 287 U. S. 575 (1932);
Broom v. Wood, 1 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. Miss. 1932), rev'd, Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1 (1932).
But the Supreme Court found it was the intent of Congress that the provisions lapse.
Wood v. Broom, supra. See 69 CONG. REc. 4054 (1928); 70 CoNG. REc. 1499, 1604, 1711
(1929); 71 CONG. REC. 254, 2279-80, 2363-4, 2443-58 (1929).
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legislatures, therefore, lies the key to unequal Congressional districting. If
the legislatures were themselves apportioned according to population, the
schemes they perpetrate might be explained as merely the result of a political
advantage pressed by representatives of a majority of the people. The facts,
however, conform to no such apologia, for most legislatures have apportioned
their own memberships at least as unequally as their Congressional delega-
tions.' 5 The result is that citizens of under-represented areas, restricted to
minority representation in the legislatures, are impotent at the polls to
secure reform of Congressional districting.
As a consequence, citizens of several states have recently turned to the
courts for relief. To date, however, their efforts have been of little avail.
In 1932, three-judge federal district courts held that Kentucky and Missis-
sippi redistricting acts contravened "compact" and "equal population"
provisions of the federal statute; 16 but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling
in Wood v. Broom " that these requirements had expired when not reenacted
in 19 2 9 .18 Illinois and Virginia courts, also in 1932, invalidated similar
statutes, but both placed partial reliance on the same federal statute, 9
15. ". . . [I]n most of our states, legislators are demonstrating their lack of faith in
the democratic process and are sabotaging self-government. . . ." A Good Try at an Old
Chestnut (1945) 34 NAT. Muxic. REV. 483. Gross inequality of legislative districting occurs
in almost every state, and again it is the cities which usually suffer. Durfee, Apportion-
ment of Representatives in the Legislature: A Study of State Constitutions (1945) 43 Micn. L.
Rnv. 1091, 1093-4; MacCorkle, Texas Reapportionment Problem (1945) 34 Nrt. MUmC.
Rnv. 540; FARMER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 19-29; REAPPORTiO.NIENr N ILLINOIS, ILL.
LEG. Couxcn REP. No. 66 (1945) 27; Walter, Reapportionment of Districts (1942) 37 ILL.
L. REv. 20, 38; Stewart, A Study of Gerrymandering in Kcntuc y (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 417-24.
Welsh, Government by Yokel (1924) 3 Amx. MEc. 199; Neuberger, Last Stand of Rotten Bar-
oughs, The Progressive, June 10, 1946, p. 9, cols. 2, 3. The problem is not new. In 1836 the
Democratic minority boycotted the Maryland Senate because of inequalities in representa-
tion. ANDmRws, HIsToRY OF MARYLAND (1929) 462-5. And one of the causes of Dorr's
Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 was an apportionment which penalized the groing in-
dustrial areas. SCHLESINGER, TE AGE OF JACmsoN (1945) 410.
Partly the inequality results from failure of legislatures to redistrict as often as state.
constitutions direct. Even if fair when made, static .pportionment schemes then become
inequitable as population shifts. Of 31 states whose constitutions order periodic redistrict-
ing, only 14 have acted within the designated period, and in six states no reapportionment
has been made for forty-five years. See FARPER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4; Walter, supra,
at 20-2, 37; REAPPORTIONMENr iN ILLrNois, supra, at 13. In other states the constitutions
themselves promote rural control. In 19, each county or town, regardless of size, must have
at least one representative in the lower house, and while some concession is made to repre-
sentation according to population, a limit on the total size of the house or some similar
device usually makes it impossible for large cities to achieve full representation. See Durfee,
supra, at 1096-1101, 1104-12; Walter, supra, at 36-7.
16. Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky. 1932); Broom v. Wood, 1 F. Supp.
134 (S. D. Miss. 1932). See Stewart, supra note 15, at 424-6.
17. 287 U. S. 1 (1932); Mahan v. Hume, 287 U. S. 575 (1932).
18. See note 14 supra.
19. Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N. E. 526 (1932); Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va.
28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932).
1946]
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and the Illinois court in 1941 reversed its stand on the strength of Wood v.
Broom.2 o
This year the Illinois statute was challenged again, this time on a ground
never before squarely adjudicated: that grossly unequal districting is, as
such, a violation of the federal Constitution.21 Except in degree, the facts
were not atypical. Despite a large increase in the state's population and a
radical change in its distribution, the Illinois legislature has not redrawn
either Congressional or legislative districts since 1901.22 As a result, the
largest Congressional district has eight times the population of the smallest,
and the largest legislative district sixteen times that of the smallest.3 In
both cases the inequality extends throughout the state, but the overall
effect is to favor "downstate" areas at the expense of Chicago.2 4 Eight
court actions, seven pleas by governors, and some nineteen bills in the legis-
lature had previously been unsuccessful in securing representation propor-
tionate to population. 5
20. Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N. E. (2d) 160 (1942).
21. Colegrove v. Green, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198 (U. S. 1946). Complainants in Wood v.
Broom, 287 U. S. 1 (1932), did not argue the Constitutional issue, and the Court made no
mention of it.
22. 46 ILL. ANN. STATS. (Smith-Hurd 1944) §§ 154-6. Failure to reapportion the Gen-
eral Assembly every ten years has been in violation of a specific directive in the state con-
stitution. ILL. CONST. Art. IV, § 6. In 1901 Illinois was entitled to 25 Congressmen, and
the state was divided into as many districts. From 1911 to 1940 it was allotted 27 Congress-
men and elected two at large rather than redistrict the whole state. In 1941 it lost one seat
and has since chosen one representative at large. Had the state's quota dropped below
25 after any census, the legislature would have had to redistrict the state or allow election
of the entire delegation at large. 37 STAT. 13 (1911), 46 STAT. 21 (1929), 55 STAT. 762, 2
U. S. C. § 2(a) (Supp. 1941).
23. The 7th Congressional district has a population of 914,053; while the 5th has
112,116. Five of the six largest districts in the United States are in Illinois; and, except for
the entire state of Nevada, which would be entitled to one representative no matter how
small its population, the three smallest districts in the country are also in Illinois. See
CONG. DIRECTORY, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 1946) 25-31, 68; U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
The largest legislative district (25th) has a population of 574,791, while the smallest (17th)
has only 35,534. Each elects one senator and three representatives. See REAr'pORTIONA1ENT
IN ILLINOIS, supra note 15, at 16-8.
24. Ten Congressional districts (1st to 10th) include parts of Chicago. Even though
three of these are the smallest in the state, the ten average 418,444 against an average of
247,654 for the 15 downstate districts. Thus the Chicago area, with 53% of the population
of the state, has only 40% of those representatives elected by districts. CONG. DIRECTORY,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 1946) 25-31. The election of one representative at large (see
note 22 supra) does operate as a partial sop to Chicago. Similarly in the legislature Chicago
has the six smallest districts in the state, but its other 13 are so large as to raise the combined
average to 213,860 people against a downstate average of 119,809; the Chicago districts,
aggregating 52% of Illinois' population, elect only 37% of the legislators. See RIAi, roR.
TIONMENT IN ILLINOIS, supra note 15, at 16-8.
25. Two of the cases have directly involved Congressional districting. Moran v.
Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N. E. 526 (1932); Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N. E,
(2d) 160 (1942) (both taxpayer's suits). The others have dealt with districting for the
General Assembly. Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N. E. 557 (1926) (mandamus to
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Complainants, three citizens of large districts, asked for a declaratory
judgment of the unconstitutionality of the districting statute, and inci-
dental relief." A three-judge federal district court, deeming itself bound by
Wood v. Broom, reluctantly dismissed the bill,- and the Supreme Court
affirmed, in Colegrove v. Green, four to three.3 Three members of the major-
ity, speaking through Justice Frankfurter,O3 denied relief, first, on the basis
of Wood v. Broom; second, for want of equity because the issues were "of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determina-
tion"; and third, because of a belief that the Constitution gives Congress
alone the authority to assure fair representation. Justice Rutledge, casting
the deciding vote, concurred in the want of equity argument because of the
fear that invalidation of the statute might "cause a clash with the political
departments." Justice Black, dissenting with two associates, O first spelled
legislatuire); Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N. E. 665 (1928) (to restrain payment of
legislators' salaries); People ex red. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N. E. 750 (1930)
(quo warranto); Keogh v. Neely, 50 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cerl. denied, 284 U. S.
583 (1931) (to enjoin collection of federal income tax on ground Illinois did not have repub-
lican form of government). See People v. Clardy, 334 Ill. 160, 165 N. E. 638 (1929) (convic-
tion appealed on allegation legislature which passed penal statute was unconstitutional).
When a state court in a later suit refused to listen to the plaintiff in Keog; v. Neeley, supra,
he shot the opposing counsel dead and fired at the judge, who escaped by dropping to the
floor. N. Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1936, p. 3, col. 1. The only success in these suits had an ironic
twist: in Mforan v. Bowley, supra, a 1931 districting statute was held void, leaving in effect
the more inequitable act of 1901 which uas subsequently held immune to judicial attack in
Daly v. fadison County, supra.
Since a legislative apportionment based entirely on population, as directed by the
Illinois Constitution, would upset the whole balance of power in the legislature and also
place control in the hands of a single county (Cook), the last six gubernatorial exhortations
have advocated a Constitutional amendment whereby representation would be by counties
in the state senate and by population in the house. The same consideration being inapplica-
ble to Congressional redistricting, statutory action has been urged there. ILL. CoNsT.
Art. IV, §§ 6-8; ILL. H. J. (1915) 109; id. (1933) 38, 41-2; id. (1935) 14, 33; id. (1937) 24,
39-40; id. (1941) 37, 40; id. (1945) 12; ILL. SEN. J. (1931) 12, 15-6. See (1945) 34 N&T.
Muasc. REv. 186; REAPPORTIONmENT IN ILLINOIS, supra note 15, at 5.
For a legislative history of each apportionment bill, see principal case, brief of Better
Government Association as amicus curiae, App. F.
Several detailed proposals, with maps, for redrawing the state's Congressional and
legislative districts are presented in REAPPORTIONmENT IN ILLINOIs, suprd note 15, at 8-9,
23-5, 36-40, 43-6.
26. The bill was directed against the Governor, Secretary of State, and Auditor of the
state as members exofficio of the Illinois Primary Certifying Board. In effect, complainants
wanted these officers restrained from carrying out this year's Congressional elections under
the provisions of the current statute. Had they been successful, the election would have
been at large unless Illinois had enacted an equitable substitute prior to the election. Smiley
v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932).
27. Colegrove v. Green, 64 F. Supp. 632 (N. D. Ill. 1946).
28. 66 Sup. Ct 1198 (U. S. 1946). Justice Jackson was unavailable and Chief Justice
Stone had died before the case was decided.
29. The other two were Justices Burton and Reed.
30. Justices Douglas and Murphy.
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out a "Constitutional policy" of substantially equal representation for all
inhabitants and then countered the majority's arguments. He viewed state
(and presumably Congressional) power to regulate the "manner" of elections
as operable only within that Constitutional policy, and Wood v. Broom as
standing for no broader proposition than that the current federal statute
includes no "equal population" requirement."' As for the want of equity
argument, he denied that the relief sought was either unprecedented or likely
to involve the Court in a clash with Congress, and termed it a play on
words to say that, because elections are connected with politics, courts
cannot protect the right to cast an effective ballot.
While the majority found it unnecessary to rule on the merits of the peti-
tioners' Constitutional claim, the tenor of the opinions suggests agreement
by the entire Court that the spirit of the Constitution calls for districts of
approximately equal population. To buttress this proposition, the dissen-
ters urged that apportionment of seats among the states according to popu-
lation logically implies that apportionment within the states should be on
the same basis,33 and that the established Constitutional rights to vote and
to have one's vote counted 14 similarly imply that each vote should have
roughly the same weight. 5 On a different tack, they argued that there must
31. Justice Rutledge appears to have agreed that Wood v. Broom settled only the statu-
tory issue. He also agreed that previous decisions interpreted the Constitution as giving
the Court, as well as Congress, jurisdiction over Congressional districting. The dissenters,
thus expressed a majority view on these two points. 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1208.
32. Justice Frankfurter alluded to "the standards of fairness for a representative sys-
tem," "these evils," "fair representation . . . in the Popular House," and possible Con-
gressional "default in exacting . . . obedience to its [the Constitution's] mandate." He
also compared fair districting to "many [Constitutional] commands which are not enforce-
able by courts." He also included two appendices showing "glaring disparities" in the
contours and population of districts throughout the country. 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1201-7.
Justice Rutledge mentioned the latitude which state legislatures and Congress have in
attaining approximate equality of districts "in full consistency with the Constitution."
Id. at 1209.
See Justice Stone, justifying extension to primaries of Constitutional protection for
voting rights. "Words, especially those of a Constitution, are not to be read with stultifying
narrowness." United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 320 (1941). ". . . [D]emocracy logi.
cally signifies equality in voting power. . . ." BEARD, TnE REPUBLIC (19,43) 35.
33. U. S. CO NST. AiiEi'm. XIV, § 2; see note 9 supra. Justice Black found that the
primary intent of this section was to make illegal a nation-wide system of "rotten boroughs"
as between the states, but that the ultimate purpose was to make the votes of all citizens,
equally effective in the selection of members of Congress. As one commentator has pointed
out, the Constitutional provision "comes to naught when state legislatures may perpetrate
the very injustices prohibited to Congress. [It] . . . is comparable to a law which protects
an individual from violence . . . by citizens of other states while leaving the road clear for
such violence by his next door neighbor." Stewart, supra note 15, at 426.
34. See cases cited note 7 supra. This right of course is limited to those who are eligible
under non-discriminatory state laws to vote for members of the most numerous house of the
state legislatures. See note 8 supra.
35. ". . . [A] state legislature . . . can no more destroy the effectiveness of their
vote in part and no more accomplish this in the name of 'apportionment' than under any
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be some point beyond which states cannot go in discriminating against
groups of qualified voters without running afoul of the equal protection
lause.05  ,
The majority's pivotal argument, that the issues were inappropriate for
judicial determination, follows the "political question" doctrine that regard
for the proper functioning of ihe government as a whole decrees that certain
questions be left to the exclusive determination of the political departments
-Congress and the President.Y But this doctrine has never been treated as
other name." 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1211. "Had Illinois passed an Act requiring that all of its
twenty-four Congressmen be elected by the citizens of one county, it would clearly have
amounted to a denial to citizens of the other counties of their Constitutionally guaranteed
right to vote. And I cannot imagine that an Act that would have apportioned twenty-three
Congressmen to the State's smallest county and one Congressman to all the others, would
have been sustained by any Court... The 1901 Apportionment Act here involved vio-
lates that [Constitutional] policy in the same way." Ibid.
36. "[The equal protection clause] does not permit the states to pick out certain quali-
fied citizens or groups of citizens and deny them the right to vote at all. See Nixon v. Hera-
don, 273 U. S. 536, 541, . . . ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73.... No one would deny
that the equal protection clause would also prohibit a law that would expressly give certain
citizens a half-vote and others a full vote. The probable effect of the 1901 State Apportion-
ment Act . . . will be that certain citizens .. . will ... have votes only one-ninth as
effective ... as the votes of other citizens." 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1210.
37. The Court treated the suit as though it were for an injunction, and the critical
"want of equity" argument by implication therefore draws on the maxim that "equity v,ill
not enforce political rights" as distinguished from property or civil rights. But none of the
opinions evinces a doctrinal rationale, and in the first substantive paragraph of his opinion
Justice Frankfurter sets the practical pitch for all three opinions by stating: "This is one of
those demands on judicial power kvhich cannot b4 met by verbal fencing about 'jurisdiction'.
It must be resolved by considerations on the basis of which this Court, from time to time,
has~refused to intervene in controversies. It has refused to do so because due regard for the
effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political na-
ture .. .." 66 Sup. Ct. 1198-9. In passing Justice Frankfurter does cite Giles v. Harris,
189 U. S. 475 (1903), in which the Court refused to use its equitable power to enforce Ne-
groes' right to vote in Alabama. But as Justice Frankfurter himself has said, "Apart from
this traditional restriction upon the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, there was another
difference in Giles v. Harris. The plaintiff there was in effect asking for specific performance
of his right under Alabama electoral legislation." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 272 (1939).
In other words the Court was asked to "supervise" elections, which does seem clearly beyond
its capacity. Ibid. And Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion in Giles r. Harris, supra,
said in a subsequent election case that "the objection that the subject matter of the suit is
political is little more than a play upon words." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,540 (1927).
Indeed, in two cases the Court has protected "political rights" in connection with Congrez-
sional districting by enjoining elections under statutes which had not been signed by gov-
ernors. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S. 380 (1932).
In distinguishing cases in which the right to vote has been upheld against state action,
Justice Frankfurter says, "The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered
by Illinois as a polity." 66 Sup. Ct. 1198-9. As applied to voters in districts six and eight
times as large as other districts, this statement seems at least debatable. In any casse it
would seem just as true in Smiley v. Holn or Carroll v. BecJ.er, both supra.
In a subsequent opinion Justice Rutiedge has explained the Cokegroro decision as a
"matter of discretion." Cook v. Fortson, 15 U. S. L. NVEMn 3170,3171 (1946).
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a rule of automatic application, and resort to it has only occasionally coin-
cided with cases involving politics in the usual sense of the word. Rather it
has been a discretionary formula seemingly invoked when the Court has felt
it lacked adequate judicial criteria for an adjudication on the merits, or has
been apprehensive of the practical consequences of such an adjudication. 38
It is this latter factor in which the majority in the Colegrove case frankly
beds its "want of equity" argument.
The only consequence articulated, however, was that nullification of the
challenged statute would force elections at large in Illinois, resulting in vio-
lation of a "vital" Congressional policy of election by districts. Shortage of
time probably would in fact have precluded passage of a fair substitute
before this fall's elections, 39 but to deduce that this would cause a clash be-
tween the Court and Congress appears unjustified. The specific "district"
requirement-never enforced by Congress-terminated in 1929 along with
the companion "equal population" provision.4" And while the current
38. "In determining whether a question falls in that category [i.e., the political question
category] the appropriateness . . .of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are domi-
nant considerations." Chief Justice Hughes in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 454-$
(1939). See WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed, 1929)
1326-38; Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcable Provisions of the Constitution (1931) 80 U. oF"
PA. L. REv. 54; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts (1924) 8 MINN.
L. REv. 485; Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 338; Finkelstein,
Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation (1925) 39 HARV. L. REv. 221. Cf. Weston, Political
Questions (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 296. The doctrine has been invoked particularly in
connection with federal action in foreign affairs, a field in which the Court could not tread
a path different from that of Congress or the President without embarrassing the United
States in its dealings with other nations. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30'
(1945); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829); Ware v. Hilton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796).
Domestically the main application of the doctrine has been in cases invoking the guarantee
to states of a "republican form of government." U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4. The first and
leading case arose out of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island; the Court refused to decide-
which of two competing governments was the legal government of the state, but on the very
practical grounds that a decision on the merits might mean invalidation of everything the-
incumbent government had done since acceding to office, and that if troops were required
to enforce the decision, only Congress could provide them. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1
(U. S. 1849). See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U. S. 565 (1916); Pacific States Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912). But the Court has not allowed Congress a free
hand even under this clause. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 (1910); Texas v. White, 7 Wall.
700 (U. S. 1868). See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 555 (1875). The mere fact
that the issues involve elections has not been sufficient to induce exercise of the Court's.
discretionary power to refuse a decision on the merits. "Where discrimination is sufficiently
shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact
that the discrimination relates to political rights." Chief Justice Stone in Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 11 (1944). See cases cited note 7 supra.
39. Justice Rutledge mentioned the short time remaining before the 1946 elections.
66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 1208.
40. The Constitution does not specify election by districts. In early elections some
states followed the district method and others elected on a general state-wide ticket. AiEs,
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1889,
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statute may include such a policy by implication, it also specifically directs
elections at large in certain cases.41 Indeed, as recently as 1932 a unanimous
Supreme Court disregarded the identical objection and forced elections at
large by invalidating Minnesota and Missouri redistricting measures because
they lacked gubernatorial approval; and Congress expressed no displeasure.
42
Insofar as the Court's apprehension may have been that the Illinois legis-
lature might refuse to redistrict the state in years subsequent to 1946, the
decision seems unnecessarily to assume an inconsistency between a Congres-
sional policy that elections be by districts and a judicial pronouncement that
such districts conform to basic Constitutional precepts. It also overlooks the
fact that Congress would retain in full its existing powers to enforce elections
by districts.43 Moreover, the same choice between redistricting and electing
at large will continue to confront state legislatures, as it has in the past,
(1897) 56-8. The Apportionment Act of 1842 was the first to require election by districts.
5 STAT. 491 (1842). Congress reenacted this provision after every census except that of 1850
until 1929. See note 12 supra. These statutes have had no more than a possible moral in-
fluence. Four states defied the Congressional directive and elected at large in 1842. 1
HLNDs, PRECEDENTS OF TE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1907) 170. Thereafter no state
elected its entire quota at large until 1930 when Arizona, New Mexico, and North Dakota
adopted the practice. In several other cases states have shunned the travail of redistricting
after their quotas have been increased, and have elected their additional Congressmen at
large. Illinois has elected at least one Representative at large since 1912. See note 22 supra.
And Ohio and Connecticut have done the same since 1932. A total of nine were elected at
large to the present Congress from states having more than a single Congressman. CONG.
DIRECTORY, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 1946) 6, 16, 25, 74, 92, 93. And in 1932 as many as
54 Congressmen were elected at large. See note 42 infra, and accompanying text.
The "district" provision was in the same section of the 1911 statute as the "equal
population" provision. 37 STAT. 13 (1911). The Court held that the entire section had
expired in 1929. Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1 (1932). In fact the representative who led the
fight for explicit reenactment of the 1911 provisions, Read of New York, -as not concerned
with equality of population among districts, but with the "district" requirement itself, his
fear being that New York might otherwise choose to elect at large and return 45 Democrats.
71 CONG. REc. 2279-80, 2363-4, 2443-5 (1929).
41. Until a state is redistricted after any census "according to the law thereof," repre-
sentatives previously elected at large continue to be so elected; additional representatives
are elected at large; and if the new quota is less than the number of existing districts, all are
elected at large. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), as amended 55 STAT. 762, 2 U. S. C. § 2a (Supp. 1941).
42. Two other states, Kentucky and Virginia, also elected at large in 1932 as a result
of judicial action. In Kentucky a federal district court invalidated the districting statute
and the Supreme Court did not reverse until after the election. Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp.
149 (E. D. Ky. 1932), rev'd, Mahan v. Hume, 287 U. S. 575 (1932). In Virginia the state
court struck down the statute. Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932). In the
case of Minnesota and Missouri the Court recognized that its decisions would comptl elec-
tions at large, and stated that they would be Constitutional. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355
(1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S. 380 (1932).
43. If desire to enforce election by districts were strong enough to outweigh political
exigencies, Congress could refuse to seat representatives at large. See notes 11 and 13
supra. Conceivably Congress itself could also redistrict a state. See EX pare Yarbrough,
110 U. S. 651 (1884); SCHMIECKEBIER, op. cit.-supra note 3, at 143; Chafee, supra note 4,
at 1016, n. 4.
19461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
almost every time a census results in reduction of a state's Congressional
quota.
44
Further arguments might be marshalled in support of the decision, to
the effect that judicial determination of the line between valid and invalid
districting statutes could inspire accusations of political bias, and that a
decision on the merits might open the Court's portals to a flood of cases
arising out of political squabbles. Neither argument was used in the opin-
ions, however, and neither appears forceful. While exact numerical equality
of districts is of course impossible, the subject does lend itself to mathemati-
cal criteria, and the Court could chart its course with definite, if tacit,
standards in mind. 45 Likewise, the import of an adjudication of unconstitu-
tionality could easily be limited to the precise type of situation at issue:
gross inequality of population between Congressional districts. No logical
compulsion would require an extension of the holding to cover either statutes
involving state elections-such as the county-unit system making possible
Talmadge's return to office as governor of Georgia 46-or even other types
of gerrymandering of Congressional districts.
4 7
There thus appear no overriding practical considerations to prevent judi-
cial enunciation and protection of the right of every citizen to substantially
equal representation in Congress. It therefore seems surprising that the
Court, in candidly deciding the case on a practical level, did not deem the
44. This will happen whenever a state which has elected all its Congressmen from dis-
tricts loses seats. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), as amended 55 STAT. 762, 2 U. S. C. § 2a (Snpp. 1941).
After the 1940 census seven states (Fla., Ind., Ia., Kans., Mass., Neb., and Pa.) faced this
choice and all redistricted. The three states which elected at large in 1932 as a result of
court decisions all passed new districting acts before the 1934 elections. MINN. STATS.
(Mason, Supp. 1940) 22; Mo. REv. STATS. ANN. (1943) §§ 12296-12309; VA. CODE ANN.
(1942) § 70. That no state having more than a few representatives has ever deliberately
held elections at large strongly suggests that Illinois would have been redistricted in the
near future. Elections at large would be inconvenient because of the difficulty of adapting
voting machines to large numbers of candidates, unpopular to voters accustomed to having
their own individual Congressmen, and distasteful to local party organizations and incum-
bents lacking a state-wide following. See Shumate, supra note 2.
45. Rules of thumb heretofore suggested for Congressional legislation provide samples
of the criteria available. Limits proposed have been a 20,000 difference between districts; a
75,000 difference; a 20% relative deviation above or below the average population of all
districts in a given state; and a 50% relative excess of the largest district over the smallest
one in the state. 47 CONG. Ric. 695 (1911); SCmsCKXBIER, op. cil. supra note 3, at 129-31.
Any standard tacitly chosen by the Court should, of course give ample play to legislative
discretion in adjusting district lines to precinct or county boundaries and perhaps even to
geographical features such as mountain ranges.
46. 34 CODE OF GA. ANN. (1935) § 3212. Turman v. Duckworth, 15 U. S. L. WV.Ex
2156 (N. D. Ga. 1946), appeal dismissed, 15 U. S. L. WEEx 3170 (U. S. 1946). See N. Y.
Times, July 21, 1946, § 4, p. 10, cols. 5-8; id. Aug. 16, 1946, p. 4, ccl. 2. Of the Constitutional
arguments, mentioned at pp. 134-5 supra, only equal protection would be applicable to
staie elections. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944).
47. Here again only the equal protection argument would seem applicable, since gerry-
mandering could be accomplished with districts of equal populations. See note 2 supra.
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objections to judicial action more than counterbalanced by the likely conse-
quence of judicial inaction: continued use of the machinery of representative
government to subvert the very principles on which that government is
based."
NEED FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AS PREREQUISITE
FOR GRANTING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT*
IN the case of Colegrove v. Green,' Justice Frankfurter for the majority
inadvertently committed a grievous error concernifg the law of declaratory
judgments. He states as dictum:
"And so, the test for determining whether a federal court has au-
thority to make a declaration such as is here asked, is whether the
controversy 'would be justiciable in this Court if presented in a suit
for injunction.' Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249,
262.' 2
The whole sentence, from which this quotation from the Naslville case is
taken, reads:
"Thus the narrow question presented for determination is whether
the controversy before us, which would be justiciable in this Court
if presented in a suit for injunction, is any the less so because
through a modified procedure appellant has been permitted to pre-
sent it in the state courts, without praying for an injunction or
alleging that irreparable injury will result from the collection of the
tax."1 3
This is quite different from saying that in any case a test for determining
whether a federal court may issue a declaration is whether an injunction is
issuable. In fact, no such necessity exists in any case. The federal statute
48. The history of American politics affords little hope either that dominant interests
in state legislatures will voluntarily refrain from exploiting their dominance, or that Congress
will force state action which would adversely affect a large number of its members. The part
that politics plays in apportionment measures before Congress can be seen from the 1941
struggle over the mathematical method of allotting representatives to each state. As applied
to the 1940 census the choice made a difference of a single Congressman-who would go to
Arkansas under the "equal proportions" method and to Michigan under the "major frac-
tions" method. Arkansas being a safely Democratic state, "equal proportions" had the
support of all but three Democrats in the House (except for those from Michigan), while all
but one Republican went the other way. See 87 CoNG. REc. 8087 (1941); note 9 supra.
* Colegrove v. Green, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198 (U. S. 1946).
1. 66 Sup. Ct. 1198 (U. S. 1946), relearing denied, 15 U. S. L. WVEEK, 3172 (1946),
56 YALE L. J. 127.
2. Id. at 1199.
3. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. WVallace, 288 U.S. 249, 262-3 (1933).
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expressly provides that the declaration may be issued "whether or not
further relief is or could be prayed." 4 This is an indication that a declaration
may be issued whether an injunction might or might not be asked for in
addition. The usual conditions of a bill of injunction, namely, the danger of
immediate irreparable injury and the absence of a remedy at law, are quite
unnecessary to a suit for a declaratory judgment.5
Justice Stone expressly states in the Nashville case:
"Hence, changes merely in the form or method of procedure by
which federal rights are brought to final adjudication in the state
courts are not enough to preclude review of the adjudication by this
Court, so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary pro-
ceeding, involving a, real, not a hypothetical, controversy, which is
finally determined by the judgment below. . . . As the prayer for
relief by injunction is not a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of
judicial power, allegations of threatened irreparable injury which
are material only if an injunction is asked, may likewise be dis-
pensed with if, in other respects, the controversy presented is, as in
this case, real and substantial." 6
As a matter of fact, no injunction to restrain taxes could have issued in the
Nashville case under the provisions of the Tennessee Code.
7
The declaration has its roots in equity, though it may be granted in legal
cases also. There are many reasons why an injunction may be unobtainable,
yet a declaration perfectly proper. The declaration may clarify the position
for the future, or the facts may not be deemed to warrant so drastic a remedy
as injunction, which may not lie for any number of reasons. Yet, instead of
dismissing the case, the declaration serves to adjudicate the controversy.
The requisites of a valid judicial judgment, whether denominated declara-
tory or by any other name, are only that the "case" must place in issue the
plaintiff's rights, that the defendant must be an adversary party, that their
"controversy" must be "real and substantial," and that the court's judg-
ment will conclusively determine the issue raised. Of course, where an
injunction would lie, a fortiori the milder declaration may be sought and
granted. But the established fact is that where an injunction would not lie,
a declaration may nevertheless be granted if the conditions of a judgment are
present. It is by no means true that the propriety of an injunction is a nec-
essary test for the issuance of a declaration.8  E. B.
4. 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934).
5. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 264 (1933); cf.
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145,
149 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936); Berman v. Wreck-A-Pair Bldg.
Co., 236 Ala. 301, 182 So. 54 (1938); Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 559 (1936); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander,
14 F. Supp. 201 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
6. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 262, 264 (1933).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie 1943), §§ 1127-8. See also Peterson v. Central Arizona
Light & Power Co., 56 Ariz. 231, 107 P. (2d) 205 (1940).
8. BoRCIeARD, DECLATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) 195, 365.
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REFORMULATION OF THE "FINAL DECISION" RULE-
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 54(b)-:'
THEreviewability of separate judgments rendered by district courts in
multiple suits has been a source of recurrent dissension among federal ap-
pellate courts.' The importance of this issue has increased with the extensive
joinder of claims and parties permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 2 But frequent attempts to define "finality" for purposes of appeal
have resulted only in a litter of contradictory criteria. 3 Legally the clash is
between the "pragmatic" and the "cause of action" theories of defining a
claim. 4 But considerations of expediency and certainty of appellate adminis-
tration impress a deeper significance on the controversy.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, determination of the finality
of judgments was based primarily upon procedural tests," whereby an appeal
would be heard only after all issues 6 as to all parties 7 had been adjudicated.
Exceptions to this rule were made only in rare instances where compliance
* Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indust Corp., 154 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946), cert. denied 66 Sup. Ct. 1353 (U. S. 1946).
1. Compare Crick, The Final Judgnment as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
539; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1476; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL P%%CTICE (hereinafter cited as
MooRE) (Cum. Supp. 1945) 141. For indications that this same problem causes trouble in
English jurisprudence see Counter Claim Complications (1945) 61 ScoT. L. REv. 89, 91;
Judgments, Final or Interlocutory (1945) 199 L. T. 18, 19.
2. FED. RULES Civ. PROC., 28 U. S. C. following § 723c. Rule 18 (joinder of claims
and remedies); Rule 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim); Rule 20 (permissive joinder of
parties); Rule 14 (joinder of third parties); Rule 24 (intervention). For discussion of the
principles underlying these rules of joinder see 2 MoomE 2113. Comparison of the federal
joinder provisions with those instituted in New York in 1936 (N. Y. Crv. PRAcT. Acr § 258)
can be found in (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 462. See Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U. S. 283, 285
(1942), 31 CALiF. L. REv. 90,41 Mlicu. L. REv. 535; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1476; (1941)
26 Come. L. Q. 485. See also 3 MOORE 3156.
3. See cases collected in the Note to Rule 54, ADvisoRy ComITTEE, RErORT OF
PROPOSED AmENDMENTS TO RuLns OF CrvL PROcEDURE (1946) 71.
4. These two opposing theories stem from different methods of defining a cause of
action. The pragmatic definition is generally identified with CLAI, CODE PLr.ADIG (1928)
84. The primary right definition of a cause of action is associated with PoIERoY, CODE
REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) 526. See (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 110, 112.
5. For clear statements of the general rule prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules,
see United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 411, 414 (1926); Western
Elect. Co. Inc. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 37 F. (2d) 14, 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
6. John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U. S. 82 (1922); Collins v. Miller, 252
U. S. 364 (1920); Rexford v. Brunswicke-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U. S. 339 (1913); Sheppy
v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
7. Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U. S. 262 (1893); Cory Bros. v.
United States, 47 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). Current practice still requires that the
judgment embrace all parties to an issue. Atwater v. North Am. Coal Corp., 111 F. (2d) 125
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Hunteman v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 119 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A.
Sth, 1941).
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with the separate order might cause irreparable injury.8 Since suits were
generally confined to one cause of action, this automatic rule of judicial
economy seldom resulted in hardship to litigants.
Under the policy of the Federal Rules to elaborate individual suits by
freely joining parties and claims, however, provisions for separate trials and
separate judgments were introduced.' But it was neither proper nor intended
that the Federal Rules should enlarge appellate jurisdiction; 10 the general
rule remained that circuit courts of appeals still had jurisdiction to review
only final decisions." In order to determine whether a judgment disposing
of one claim was final and reviewable, therefore, the appellate court has been
8. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 411 (1926) (govern-
mental condemnation proceedings); General Elect. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U. S.
430 (1932) (statutory right to interlocutory appeal from denial of an injunction). More re-
cently the exception made in cases of governmental condemnation proceedings has been
discontinued, Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229 (1945) which overruled the Second
Circuit decision in United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
But the statutory exception [43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 227 (1940)) allowing inter-
locutory appeal where a preliminary injunction is denied has remained. United States v.
Florian, 312 U. S. 656 (1941) rev'g and restoring first opinion in Florian v. United States,
114 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co,, 115 F.
(2d) 45 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). Additional exceptions have been made in cases where failure
to permit appeal would cause an inequitable result. Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works, 154 F.
(2d) 214 (C. C.A. 7th, 1946) (erroneous partial summary judgment would permit execution);
Kasishke v. Baker, 144 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 10th,. 1944) (order granting interest in oil lands
would permit waste of resources).
9. FED. RULES Civ. PROC., 28 U. S. C. following § 723c. Rule 13(i) (separate trials;
separate judgments); Rule 20(b) (separate trials); Rule 42 (consolidation; separate trials);
and Rule 54(b) (judgment at various stages). See also Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). Rule 54(b) reads as follows: "JUDGUENT AT
VARIOUS STAGES. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court
at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counter-
claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim,
may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action
with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining
claims. In case a separate judgment is so entered, the court by order may stay its enforce-
ment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such
conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the
judgment is entered." The Notes to the Federal Rules indicate that Rule 54(b) is based
upon N. Y. CiV. PRACT. ACT § 476 which reads, "Judgment may be rendered by the court
in favor of any party or parties, and against any party or parties, at any stage of an action
or appeal, if warranted by the pleadings or the admissions of a party or parties; and a judg-
ment may be rendered by the court as to a part of a cause of action and the action proceed
as to the remaining issues, as justice may require."
10. See 3 MOORE 3155. The history of Rule 54(b) indicates no intention to tamper
with jurisdiction. See R. G. Dodge and W. D. Mitchell in Proceedings of A.B.A. Instillite
on Federal Rules (1939) 174, 329, 339.
11. The "new" policy as to appeals from separate judgments was first discussed in
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) and later
asserted by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U. S. 283, 285 (1942); see, further,
Toomey v. Toomey, 149 F. (2d) 19, 20 (App. D. C. 1945).
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forced to examine the factual basis of the issue on which judgment was
rendered.
But two contradictory approaches to the problem have left adjudications
under the "final decision" rule in serious conffict. 2 The "pragmatic" ap-
proach, generated by code reasoning, places emphasis on the facts of the
occurrence rather than the legal theories of the case. 13 By this reasoning, if
several claims are founded upon the same set of facts, a judgment on one
claim alone will not support appellate jurisdiction. The "cause of action"
approach, on the other hand, stems from the common law principle that
each legal theory constitutes a distinct cause of action. 14 Thus, if a claim is
such a cause of action as would support a separate suit for relief, a decision
upon it is said to be fial and reviewable. Variously applying these prin-
ciples, circuit courts of appeals have drawn the line of "finality" with an
unsteady hand. 5
Judge Clark, the leading advocate of the more generally accepted "prag-
matic" theory,16 considered the problem at length in the recent case of
12. The inconclusiveness of the "final decision" rule is commented on in United States
v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. (2d) 678, 680, notes 3 and 4 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) and Kasishke
v. Baker, 144 F. (2d) 384, 385 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944). See also Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J.
1476, 1481-2; 1 MoonE (Cum. Supp. 1945) 92.
13. The pragmatic method of defining a separate claim is exemplified by Rosenblum v.
Dingfelder, 111 F. (2d) 406, 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ["Rule 54(b) provides for a separate
judgment on one of several claims upon a determination of all issues material to it, and thus
shows that otherwise only one final judgment is contemplated; . . ."], and Audi Vision
Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621, 624 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ["Rule 54(b) purports only
to modify the previously existing law that a final judgment must finally dispose of all matters
at issue in the case .... to one requiring complete disposition of a single transaction and
all maters connected with it; . . ."]. Compare Bowles v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.,
107 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 130 F. (2d) 535
(C. C. A. 7th, 1942); Wright v. Gibson, 128 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Toomey v.
Toomey, 149 F. (2d) 19 (App. D. C. 1945).
14. The cause of action theory is represented by decisions such as Zarati S. S. Co. v.
Park Bridge Corp., 154 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946); Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d)
895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Lydick v. Fischer, 13S F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A. Sth, 1943); Hanney v.
Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Crutcher v.
Joyce, 134 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
15. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939),
which is still good law in the Second Circuit, is an example of a confusion of the two prin-
ciples. Judge Clark has said that a cause of action may mean different things for different
purposes. See note 28 infra. That uncertainty to litigants has resulted, see Note (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 1476, 1482; 3 MooRE (Cum. Supo. 1945) 146-53; 1 Moonn (Cum. Supp. 1945)
92-3.
16. Judge Clark's views on the subject can be traced through a series of Second Circuit
decisions with considerable consistency. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.
(2d) 83, 86 (1939) (concurring opinion); Atwater v. North Am. Coal Corp., 111 F. (2d) 125,
126 (1940) (concurring opinion); Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. (2d) 406 (1940); Sidis v.
F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 811 (1940) (dissenting in part); Audi Vision v. RCA Mfg.
Co., 136 F. (2d) 621 (1943); Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 905 (1943) (dissenting
in part); Zarati S. S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F. (2d) 377, 381 (1946) (dizmting);
1946]
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Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp.'7 In a patentee's
suit for infringement, defendant answered by denial of infringement, in-
validity of the patents, and the "unclean hands" claim '8 of plaintiff's monop-
olistic use of the patents. On plaintiff's motion, the district court dismissed
the third defense. 9 Defendant's appeal from this order was denied by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the ground that the
order complained of was not "final." 20 Judges Clark and Swan regarded
the allegation of patent abuse as an affirmative defense, 21 arising out of the
same transaction as the claim of infringement, and involving the validity
of the patent which had not yet been adjudicated. The court's opinion
drew support from the "historic federal policy" of precluding piecemeal'
review of litigation for the sake of judicial economy.22
Judge Frank's dissent, on the other hand, was based primarily on the
"cause of action" theory.23 Regarding the defense of monopolistic use of
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indust. Corp., 154 F. (2d) 814 (1946). See 3
MooRE (Cum. Supp. 1945) 145-52 for approval of the consistency of Clark's views, but see
contra (1942) 31 CALIF. L. REv. 90, 92-4.
17. 154 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). cert. denied 66 Sun. Ct, 1353 (U. S. 1946).
18. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U. S. 806, 814 (1945); Gynex Corp. v. Dilex Institute of Feminine Hygiene, 85 F. (2d) 103,
106 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); General Elect. Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 45 F. Supp. 714, 717
(S. D. N. Y. 1942). See Comment (1945) 45 COL. L. REv. 601, 609; J. M. and W. H. Hender-
son, Patent Licenses and the Anti-Trust Laws (1945) 24 NEB. L. lrv. 225, 230.
19. 67 U. S. PAT. Q. 84 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
20. 154 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
21. United States v. Continental Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934)
(order to strike affirmative defense not appealable) followed, after the adoption of the
Federal Rules, in Shultz v.'Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 103 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939) and Markham v. Kaspar, 152 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945). Orders as to other
pleading motions are regularly considered interlocutory and non-appealable. Doehler Metal
Furniture Co., Inc. v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 130, 135 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Jones v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F. (2d) 123, 125 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (denial of summary
judgment); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 130 F. (2d) 535, 536 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942)
(grant of partial summary judgment); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F. (2d) 387,
388 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) (denial of motion to institute class action); Partridge v, Clarkson,
72 F. (2d) 108, 110 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (dismissal of portion of complaint); Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 154 F. (2d) 545, 546 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946) (dismissal of
third party claim); and Bowles v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. (2d) 169, 170
(C. C. A. 4th, 1939) (order to submit to physical examination).
22. Note to Rule 54, ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF PROPOsED AMENDMENTS TO
RULES OF CivIL PROCEDURE (1946) 70, reads in part: "The historic rule in the federal courts
has always prohibited piecemeal disposal of litigation and permitted appeals only from final
judgments .... Rule 54(b) was originally adopted . . .to avoid the possible injustice of
a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case.
It was not designed to overturn the settled federal rule ... ." See Judge Clark, dissenting,
in Zarati S. S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F. (2d) 377, 382 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) "With this
unsettling of the law, I fear we are inviting piecemeal appeals and making the enforcement
of the federal policy difficult and aleatory."
23. 154 F. (2d) 814, 817 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
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the patent as a permissive counterclaim which could support a separate suit,
he argued that its dismissal should therefore be entitled to separate appeal.
In his view, moreover, policy demanded prompt action on the "unclean
hands" claim, in order to give early hearing to charges of patent abuse and
to deter the use of the infringement suit as an additional ccercive weapon. 2
Since the majority and minority opinions utilize the principal criteria de-
veloped by courts as guides in the application of the two opposing theories
of finality, the case has the value of clearly defining the conflict. These
criteria, however, appear to serve more as rationalizations of the result than
as compelling factors in reaching it. For the choice between the two theories
in a specific case is frequently influenced by the particular court's attitude
toward interlocutory appeals, and by its interest in the merits of the case.Y
Thus, exponents of the "pragmatic" method " may experience difficulty
in deciding whether two claims are based on the same transaction or set of
facts. For example, in the principal case Judge Clark concluded that proof
of the "unclean hands" claim would involve substantially the same evidence
as would be required on the trial of the patent's validity.- But in a prior
case he failed to find the "identic core" common to counts for copyright in-
fringement of a book and for unfair competition in using the book's title. 3
By a more procedural variant of the "pragmatic" test, however, the court
24. See Comment (1945) 45 CoL. L. Rnv. 601, 623, and compare Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944), 57 HARv. L. Rnv. 574,44 COL. L. REv.
447; but cf. Note (1944) 92 U. oF PA. L. REv. 461. See further, Sola Elect. Co. v. Jefferson
Elect. Co., 317 U. S. 173, 174 (1942), discussed in (1943) 56 HARV. L. REv. 814 (1943) 17
TEMP. L. Q. 192.
25. See Judge Clark, dissenting, in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 903 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943) and Judge Frank, dissenting, in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylv-ania Indust.
Corp., 154 F. (2d) 814, 822 n. 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). Judge Frank has also made the broad
proposal that the Advisory Committee recommend statutory changes to give appellate
courts general discretion to hear appeals from interlocutory orders, Audi Vision Inc. .
RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621, 626 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d)
895, 898 n. 3B (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). For a similar proposal, see (1939) 26 Vat. L. REv. 223, 224.
26. The criterion is best expressed in such cases as Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA 'fg. Co.,
136 F. (2d) 621, 624 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) and Wright v. Gibson, 128 F. (2d) 865, 867 (C. C. A.
9th, 1942). See also Judge Clark's opinions in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
106 F. (2d) 83, 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) (concurring); Atwater v. North Any. Coal Corp.,
111 F. (2d) 125, 126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (concurring); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d)
806, 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (dissenting in part); and Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895,
905 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) (dissenting). Use of this test in other circuits include Cohen v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 120 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
130 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); Toomey v. Toomey, 149 F. (2d) 19 (App. D. C. 1945).
27. 154 F. (2d) 814, 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
28. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939)
(concurring opinion); see also Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 811 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940); United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67 (1933). For criticisms of
these decisions and the "pragmatic" test as applied, see 3 MOORE (Cum. Supp. 1945) 146-7;
(1941) 26 Conx. L. Q. 485, 487; (1942) 31 CALI.. L. REv. 90,93.
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may rely on the effect of possible affirmance of the judgment.29 If further
adjudication would be required to make the order effective, it is not final;
conversely, if execution could be levied on the judgment, it is held to be
appealable. I
On the other hand, those courts which apply the "cause of action" tleory,
utilizing the measure of an independent suit to determine finality, 10 often
take guidance from the nature of the relief asked by the particular claim on
which judgment was rendered. This test may be applied to claims raised by
either plaintiff or defendant; thus, where an answer would accomplish any-
thing beyond mere denial of the complaint, or asks affirmative relief of any
nature, an appeal will be heard. For example, proponents of the "cause of
action" theory argue that in patent litigation the mere defense of invxalidity
in an infringement suit is a request for affirmative relief.
3 '
" In the application of the "cause of action" theory to counterclaims, the
distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims introduced
by Federal Rule 13 serves as a guide. Dismissal or denial of a permissive
counterclaim, like an independent action, is regarded as final and separately
appealable. 32 To decide whether a particular counterclaim is permissive or
compulsory, two criteria have been devised. Whereas res judicata bars
compulsory counterclaims which are or might be pleaded in an action, per-
29. Prior to the Federal Rules this principle was enunciated by such cases as Collins v.
Miller, 252 U. S. 364 (1920); United States v. Continental Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 107
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) and United States v. Bighorn Sheep Co., 276 Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 8th,
1921). The test has been applied in at least three circuits since 1938. Bowles v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); Karl Kiefer Mach. Co. v. U. S.
Bottlers Mach. Co., 108 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Russell v. Barnes Foundation,
136 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); Markham v. Kaspar, 152 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 7th,
1945); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 154 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
30. See Moreno v. United States, 120 F. (2d) 128, 130 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Lewis v. Vendome
Bags, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 16, 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cerl. denied 309 U. S. 660 (1940) (but see
Judge Clark's dissent); Hanney v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F. (2d) 864,
865 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944).
31. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Leach v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co., 104 F.
(2d) 88 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Dominion Elect. Mfg. Co. v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 126 F.
(2d) 172 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cert.
denied 319 U. S. 748 (1943); Trico Products Corp. v. Anderson Co., 147 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A.
7th, 1945).
32. The following cases found the counterclaim permissive and therefore separate:
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944); Big Cola Corp. v. World
Bottling Co., Ltd., 134 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); Isenberg v. Biddle, 125 F. (2d) 741
(App. D. C. 1941); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Univeisal Lubricating Systems, Inc,, 29 F.
Supp. 846 (W. D. Pa. 1939). Cases in which the court found a compulsory counterclaim are:
Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Hancock Oil Co. v.
Universal Oil Products Co., 115 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); Kaumagraph Co. v. General
Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). See also Audi Vision 'Inc. v. RCA
Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621, 624 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc.,
141 F. (2d) 864, 869 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
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missive counterclaims are not so governed. Thus, if a counterclaim available
at the time of a previous suit would not be barred by the former judgment,
it is labeled permissive,3 3 and judgment on it is "final." Or the court may
examine the counterclaim for independent jurisdiction; since a permissive
counterclaim is required to have individual grounds for jurisdiction, 34 a
counterclaim is said to be permissive if such grounds would be required. a3
Judge Frank relied on these criteria in the instant case, employing elaborate
legal reasoning to demonstrate that the allegation of patent abuse was a
permissive counterclaim.01 Yet, paradoxically, Rule 13, on which this entire
theory of counterclaims is based, words the distinction in the pragmatic
terms of "transaction or occurrence" rather than claim or cause of action.n
In order to evaluate the "final decision" rule as expounded in this case,
examination of the principles on which it is founded is necessary. The rule
takes its name from the language of Section 128 of the Judicial Code.m By
strictly limiting appellate review, it is intended to accomplish the following
four purposes: 9 1) to expedite judicial business by preventing appeal on
errors which may later be proven harmless; 4 0 2) to provide uniformity and
certainty of judicial administration for litigants; 3) to eliminate, in conform-
ity with the spirit of the Federal Riles, the emphasis on pleadings which
33." Compare the opinion of Justice Douglas in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.
Co., 320 U. S. 661, 671 (1944) with that of Justice Roberts, dissenting, id. at 675. See also
Jefferson Elect. Co. v. Sola Elect. Co., 122 F. (2d) 124, 126 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) [criticized in
3 MooRE (Cum. Supp. 1945) 55]; Clair v. Kastar, 138 F. (2d) 828, 830 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943);
dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 811 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940); and cases collected in note 32 supra.
34. Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926). The reasoning of this case
has been followed and expanded in Kaumagraph Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F.
Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); Isenberg v. Biddle, 125 F. (2d) 741 (App. D. C. 1941); Les-
nik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). But see Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F. (2d) 211, 216 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) (determi-
nation of type of counterclaim immaterial to jurisdiction). See also Ohlinger, Jurisdictiot:,
Venue and Process as to Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims (1945) 6 FrD. B. A. J. 420,
427; Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limi~lions on Fcdcral Procedure (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 393,410; 1 MlooRE (Cum. Supp. 1945) 321.
35. See Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 897 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); followed in
Derman v. Stor-Aid, 141 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). See also I Moons 695.
36. 154 F. (2d) 814, 817 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
37. Rule 13, FED. RuLEs Civ. PRoc., 28 U. S. C. following § 723c. The Rule states
that counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim sued on,
are compulsory; other counterclaims are permissive.
38. 43 STAT. 936 (1925) as amended June 20, 1938, 52 STAT. 779 (1938), 28 U. S. C.
§ 225 (1940).
39. See Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621, 624 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943);
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indust. Corp., 154 F. (2d) 814, 817 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946).
40. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 325 (1940); Perkins -%. Endicott
Johnson Corp., 128 F. (2d) 208, 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) aff'd 317 U. S. 501 (1943); Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 84 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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would result from piecemeal review; 41 and 4) to prevent the delay caused
by leaving the main action in abeyance during the appeal.4"
But the present Rule 54 (b) and current criteria for deciding finality do
not, in practice, serve these purposes successfully. The large number of
cases on the issue belie the claim that the rule decreases litigation. 43 For,
as in the instant case, the appellate court must examine the substance of
each case in order to apply its criteria, even though! the majority of such
appeals are ultimately dismissed. Nor is any uniformity or certainty of
decision on the issue evidenced by a survey of the precedents in the several
circuits. In the absence of an objective test for finality, parties who wait to
appeal all issues together may jeopardize their rights; 44 the threat of immne-
diate execution on the order, and the risk of expiration of appeal time, force
litigants to appeal each order separately.4
In an attempt to cure the faults of this rule, the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure proposes a complete revision of Rule 54 (b).
Returning to a strictly procedural test, the new rule relegates the determina-
tion of finality entirely to the district court level, allowing appeal of only
such orders as have been expressly marked "final" by the lower court. And
the district court may mark an order final "only upon an express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay." 41 While the purpose of the rule
41. See opinions of Judge Clark in Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621,
625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) and in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indust. Corp.,
154 F. (2d) 814, 817 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). He believes that the reason the large majority of
decisions on the "final decision" rule are in the Second Circuit is that New York lawyers are
accustomed to practice under the New York state rules permitting interlocutory appeals.
See particular examples cited in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 907 n. 5 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943).
42. See, for example, Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, III F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
43. See Note (1943) 147 A. L. R. 583.
44. The unfairness to litigants of an uncertain rule is discussed in Collins v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 84 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), (1940) 49 YA,= L. J. 1476,
1482; Sidis v. F-R Pub..Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), (1941) 26 CoRN.
L. Q. 485, 488. A special desire to suit "the convenience of parties," when that happens to
coincide with furtherance of the policy of preventing patent abuse, is evidenced by Judge
Frank's opinion in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 898 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) and his
concurring opinion in Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621, 625 (C. C. A. 2d,
1943). But the Third Circuit has considered the court's convenience to be more important
than that of the litigants. Cohen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 120 F. (2d) 791, 792 (C. C. A.
3d, 1941).
45. For examples of the threat of execution, compare Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works,
154 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946) (summary judgment on part of claim for compensation
of services); Kasishke v. Baker, 144 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) (decree of part title to
oil lands prior to completion of accounting); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129F.
(2d) 678 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) (decree of condemnation prior to determination of compensa.
tion). See also (1940) 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 358, 359 for expression of this difficulty. The
possibility of having the appeal barred by the statute of limitations is suggested in Jefferson
Elect. Co. v. Sola Elect. Co., 122 F. (2d) 124, 126 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) and Kasishko v.
Baker, 144F. (2d) 384, 386 (C. C.A. 10th, 1944). See also-Note (1943) 147 A. L. R. 583, 584.
46. The Proposed Rule reads as follows: "Rule 54(b) JUDGMENT UPON MULTI,1LE
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is clearly to minimize appeals, discretion is granted to the district court to
"afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case." '?
In prospect, the proposed rule appears to answer most of the criticisms
leveled at the present Rule 54 (b). The return to an objective test of finality
will decrease litigation, since appealability will be apparent on the face of
the record. Certainty of the commencement of appeal time, and of the time
when execution can be levied on the judgment, will also be achieved. And
automatic uniformity among the circuits should follow. If district courts
conform to the spirit of the new rule, the use of Rule 54 (b) to take inter-
locutory appeals will be ended. In the majority of instances the rule will be
self-operating and will prevent appeal. The substantive controversy over
finality, requiring a balance of judicial expediency and convenience to
parties, 48 will be raised only when a party specifically petitions that the
district court declare an order final and appealable.
The novel grant of discretion to the district courts,4 to determine what
orders an appellate court may review, will be the most controversial point
in the new rule. Critics may argue that such a rule gives the district courts
an unconstitutional control of appellate jurisdiction, that it violates Sec-
tion 128 of the Judicial Code, and that it is beyond the purported scope of
the Federal Rules. But if there is to be an appraisal of the transaction in
issue, the district court is the logical court to make it. For, as the trial court,
it has already heard the case, whereas the appellate court would have to
examine all the facts and issues in the case anew. " ' And the uniformity of
judicial administration expected under the new rule should clearly com-
pensate for any technical infringement of the appellate court's right to
control its jurisdiction.
CLAIMS. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims." ADvisoRY Cor-
MITTEE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDmENTS TO RULEs oF CIvIL PROCEDURE (1946) 70.
47. Ibid.
48. See notes 40 and 44 supra.
49. ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF PROPOSED ArIENDuEiNrs To RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1946) 70. A plan for giving such discretion to the district court, in practice,
was broached judicially by Judge Augustus Hand in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83, 84 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). See also (1940) 13 So. Cu.r. L. REv. 353,361
and (1942) 41 MICH. L. REv. 535, 536. It was recently suggested again in Toomey v.
Toomey, 149 F. (2d) 19, 20 (App. D. C. 1945).
50. See Judge Clark's criticism of suggested statutory changes to permit appellate dis-
cretion to review interlocutory orders, Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F. (2d) 621,
625 n. 2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) and Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 907 (C. C. A. 2d,
1943).
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RECIPROCAL INHERITANCE STATUTES
AND FEDERAL POWERS*
STATUTES in several states allow aliens who are non-residents of the
United States to take real or personal property within the jurisdiction by
will or intestate succession only if their respective countries grant such rights
reciprocally to American citizens.' The constitutionality of such a provision
was drawn into question in the recent case of In re Bevilacqua's Estate,2 in
which the California legislation, passed in 1941, was challenged as infringing
on fields reserved to, or preempted by, the Federal government.
* In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589 (Cal. App. 1945).
1. See CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. (Deering, 1941) §§ 259, 259.1, 259.2, amended by
CAL. STAT. 1945, c. 1160, §§ 1-3; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Supp. 1939) § 7090.2; ORE.
COMP. LAWS ANN. (1940) § 61-107. See also Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850 (N. D. Cal.
1943); It re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589 (Cal. App. 1945); In re Knutzen's Estate,
161 P. (2d) 598 (Cal. App. 1945); Bottomly v. Meagher County, 114 Mont. 220, 133 P. (2d)
770 (1943); In re Braun's Estate, 161 Ore. 503, 90 P. (2d) 484 (1939).
2. 161 P. (2d) 589 (Cal. App. 1945), petition for hearing granted by California Su-
preme Court, 27 Advance Cal. Rep. No. 4, Minutes, p. 2.
3. The probate provision as enacted and at the time of the litigation read as follows:
"Section 259: The rights of aliens not residing within the United States or its territories
to take either real or personal property or the proceeds thereof in the State by succession or
testamentary disposition upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of
the United States is dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the
part of citizens of the United States to take real and personal property and the proceeds
thereof upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective
countries of which such aliens are inhabitants and citizens and upon the rights of citizens of
the United States to receive by payment to them within the United States or its territories
money originating from the estates of persons dying within such foreign countries.
"Section 259.1: The burden shall be upon such nonresident aliens to establish the fact
of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth in Section 259.
"Section 259.2: If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heirs other than
such aliens are found eligible to take such property, the property shall be disposed of as
escheated property."
Subsequent to the Bevilacqua decision, by Assembly Bill No. 2071, effective September 15,
1945, Sections 259.1, and 29.2 have been repealed, and Section 259 now reads:
"The right of aliens not residing within the United States or its territories to take real
property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and
conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case upon
the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take real
property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective
countries of which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not residing in the United
States or its territories to take personal property in this State by succession or testamentary
disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United
States is dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take personal property upon the same terms and conditions
as residents and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents. It
shall be presumed that such reciprocal rights exist and this presumption shall be conclusive
unless prior to the hearing on any petition for distribution of all or a portion of such prop.
erty to an alien heir, devisee, or legatee not residing within the United States or in its tern|-
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The issue arose on the death intestate of Ignazio Bevilacqua, a resident of
California, survived by a widow and four children, all residents and citizens
of Italy, and leaving an estate of approximately $9,000. Application for
letters of administration was made both by the decedent's cousin and the
Public Administrator of San Francisco, the latter contending that the
statute was unconstitutional and that the widow and children were the
heirs at law. The cousin based his claim on the theory that since, by opera-
tion of the statute, the non-resident alien relatives were disqualified by a
failure to prove the necessary reciprocity, he became the "next of kin en-
titled to share in the estate" and as such to administer it according to Cali-
fornia law. 4 Without determining the existence of reciprocal rights, the
probate court held the statute unconstitutional and granted the letters of
administration to the Public Administrator.5
Urging three principal grounds for affirmance on appeal, respondent
Public Administrator and the United States as avicus curiae alleged the
statute to be (1) an indirect regulation of foreign trade in violation of the
commerce clause ;6 (2) an attempted exaction of reciprocal rights from other
countries, and an embarrassing interference in international affairs, thereby
invading a sphere reserved to the United States by the treaty clause;' and
(3) an interference with the exclusive power of the Federal Government to
capture enemy property during wartime,8 in the exercise of which power
Congress had passed the Trading with the Enemy Act,0 thereby fully occupy-
ing the field of alien property rights. 0 These contentions were buttressed
by a "declaration of urgency" appended to the enactment by the legisla-
ture, declaring the statute to be an "urgency measure" because of the pos-
sible use of estates moneys by foreign nations in a war against the United
States.' This statement, it was claimed, showed that the Act was primarily
tories a petition is filed by any person interested in the estate requesting the court to find
that either one or both of such reciprocal rights does not or do not exist as to the country
of which such alien heir, devisee or legatee is resident. Upon the hearing of such petition
the burden of establishing the non-existence of such reciprocal right or rights shall be upon
the petitioner. Notice of such hearing shall be given in the manner provided by Section 1200
of this code."
4. See CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. (Deering, 1941) § 422, providing for order of privity in
granting letters of administration to a decedent's estate.
5. See In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589, 591 (Cal. App. 1945).
6. U. S. CoxsT. ART. I, § 8. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 11-24.
7. U. S. CON sT. ART. I, § 10. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 26-7; Brief for Atrdcus
Curiae, p. 23.
8. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8, Cls. 11, 18. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 27-8.
9. 40 STAT. 415 (1917), 50 U. S. C., App. § 6 (1928); 54 STAT. 179 (1940), 12 U. S. C.,
§ 95a (1945).
10. See Brief for Amrnus Curiae, pp. 13-18.
11. The "declaration of urgency," CAL. STAT. 1941, c. 895, § 2, reads:
"This act is hereby declared to be an urgency measure necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety within the meaning of Section I of
Article IV of the Constitution of the State of California, and shall take effect immediately.
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designed to control the international flow of currency and credits and was
therefore a probate measure in name only.
The District Court of Appeal, however, pointing out that the "declaration
of urgency" purported merely to explain why the legislation should take
effect immediately, rather than after the expiration of the customary wait-
ing period, 12 declined to examine the legislative motives underlying the
enactment for the purpose of invalidating the substantive law. Treating
the Act as a probate regulation, the Court decided that estates funds are
not "commerce" within the purview of the commerce clause, denied any
invasion of or conflict with federal rights, and unequivocally upheld the
statute's constitutionality. 3
Once it is thus assumed that the enactment is merely a regulation of the
transmission of property at death, a determination in favor of its validity
would seem inescapable, since states have an historic right to legislate as to
the transfer by will or intestacy of property within the jurisdiction,14 and
and "to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposi-
tion." 15 Pursuant thereto, most states, for example, have enacted provisions
to remove, in whole or in part, the common-law disability of aliens to inherit
or transmit realty by descent. 6 Other states have allowed such privileges
only to certain classes of foreign nationals.1
7
This right of control over transfer of a decedent's property, inherent in
the concept of sovereignty, served as the rationale in Mager v. Grinma,'8
cited by the California District Court of Appeal as authority for the proposi-
The following is a statement of the facts constituting such necessity: A great number of
foreign nations are either at war, preparing for war or under the control and domination of
conquering nations with the result that money and property left to citizens of California is
impounded in such foreign countries or taken by confiscatory taxes for war uses, Likewise
money and property left to friends and relatives in such foreign countries by persons dying
in California is often never received by such nonresident aliens but is seized by these for-
eign governments and used for war purposes. Because the foreign governments guilty of
these practices constitute a direct threat to the Government of the United States, it is
immediately necessary that the property and money of citizens dying in this country should
remain in this country and not be sent to such foreign countries to be used for the purpose
of waging a war that eventually may be directed against the Government of the United
States."
12. "It is simply the explanation required by the state constitution why Sections 259,
259.1, and 259.2 should become operative immediately rather than 90 days after the ad-
journment of the legislature." In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589, 594 (Cal. App.
1945).
13. This decision was approved and followed in In re Knutzen's Estate, 161 P. (2d)
598 (Cal. App. 1945), petition for hearing granted by California Supreme Court, 27 Advance
Cal. Rep., No. 7, Minutes, p. 1.
14. For an enunciation of this principle by the United States Supreme Court, see Mager
v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493 (U. S. 1850). See also GiBsoN, ALIENS AND Tut LAw (1940) 45.
15. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942).
16. See ATxxNsoN, WILLS (1937) 71-2.
17. Ibid.
18. 8 How. 490, 493 (U. S. 1850).
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tion that estates proceeds are not "commerce." In that case a Louisiana
inheritance tax on legacies to aliens was assailed as an attempted tax on
exports and regulation of foreign commerce. The Supreme Court, emphasiz-
ing that it is within the scope of state power to attach to testate or intestate
succession "any conditions which it supposes to be required by its interests
or policy," " upheld the tax and declared "it certainly has no concern with
commerce or with imports or exports." 20 Indeed, to hold otherwise would
lead to a prohibition of state taxation on property whenever the owner had
the intention of selling it and sending the proceeds abroad. However, even
if money or property from a decedent's estate passing to a non-resident alien
should be considered foreign commerce, in view of Congressional silence on
the subject it seems logical that the states are free to continue their long-
exercised powers of regulation until clearly prohibited.2 '
Nor can a reciprocal inheritance statute be said to represent an invasion of
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, forbidding states to enter into
treaties. Although alien inheritance rights are a fitting subject for inter-
national compacts,2 that fact has never been held to preclude state action.
Since a treaty is the supreme law of the land, any conflicting state law must
yield.2 3 But it seems well settled that state regulations as to property
ownership or transmission by aliens become dormant pro tent only as to
those foreign nationals whose rights are governed by a conflicting treaty, 4
and are revived on its expiration,25 while in the absence of 'treaty, local law
19. Id. at 494.
20. Ibid.
21. See Note (1941) 29 GEo. L. J. 755, 763-6.
22. See Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1377, 1391; (1922) 17 A. L. R. 635, 637; (1941) 134
A. L. R. 882, 887, and cases cited. For a list of treaties covering aliens' rights in this respect,
see GIBsoN, ALIENS AND THE LAW (1940) app. 167, 171. See also Note (1937) 37 COL. L.
REv. 1361.
23. State laws relating to property transfer, devise, or inheritance have been held sus-
pended by conflicting treaties in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U. S. 1817); Hauenstein v.
Lynhand, 100 U. S. 483 (1879); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1890).
24. See Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195 (1893), writ of error dismissed,
254 U. S. 524 (1893); TaompsoN, WLLs (2d. ed. 1936) §§ 56, 77.
25. Determining the relationship of the Franco-American conventions of 1800 and
1853 to the laws of Maryland as they affected the rights of French citizens, the United States
Supreme Court stated, in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890), that while the 1800
treaty was in existence, it "... . controlled the statute and common law of Maryland when-
ever it differed from them. The treaty expired by its own limitation in eight years, pursuant
to an article inserted by the Senate. .. . During its continuance, citizens of France could
take property in the District of Columbia by inheritance from citizens of the United States.
But after its expiration that right was limited as provided by the statute and common law
of Maryland . . . until the convention between the United States and France was con-
cluded, February 23, 1853."
For a declaration that state laws merely "are suspended during the life of a treaty"
and are not "void as an unwarranted interference with . . . the powers of the federal
government," see Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431, 436, 59 Pac. 787, 788 (1900). In affirm-
ing the California decision, the United States Supreme Court noted that in case of a con-
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of course controls. Furthermore, treaties are generally drawn so as to allow
full effect to state law.2 Similarly, although such agreements between na-
tions often deal with inheritance rights in terms of reciprocity, it can hardly
be concluded that these conditions cannot be imposed by local enactment
or that any attempt so to do is an effort to "exact concessions from foreign
countries" 2 and thus indirectly enter into a treaty.
Moreover, as pointed out by the Court in the Bevilac qua case with refer-
ence to the California statute, 28 there is little validity in an allegation that
such a law is a "possible source of embarrassment" to the United States in
the foreign relations field. 29 By conditioning non-resident aliens' rights on
reciprocity, the state legislation impliedly anticipates exercise of the federal
treaty power, for if a treaty granting reciprocal privileges exists, the courts
must take judicial notice of it 30 and can apply the statute accordingly. If
no treaty is involved, presumably foreign nationals will receive the same
treatment as their countries afford American citizens. Certainly the land
acts in Western states, depriving non-declarant aliens of many rights in
realty, 31 are potentially far more provocative of international ill-will than
a reciprocal inheritance probate provision. Yet they have never been as-
sailed on this ground.32 Also, should Congress at any time desire to render
nugatory the California law and others similar to it, it can do so by the
exercise of its treaty-making powers.
For like reasons, unless it is conceded that the Trading with the Enemy
Act indicates a Congressional purpose to preempt the field of alien inherit-
ance rights, such a statute does not interfere with the exercise of federal
wartime powers of capture. Admittedly the Alien Property Custodian is
authorized to sequester the property of enemy nationals,3 3 but it is for the
state to declare when the alien acquires an interest. Under the interpretation
flict "the state law was suspended during the treaty or the term provided for therein."
Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 340 (1901).
26. GIBSON, op. cit. supra note 22 at 37-8, 49-50.
27. See Brief for Respondent, p. 26.
28. See In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589, 595-6 (Cal. App. 1945).
29. See Brief for Amici s Curiae, p. 23. On this point the United States focused its at-
tack largely on the clause of Section 259, requiring as a condition for inheritance by non-
resident aliens that United States citizens be allowed "to receive by payment . . . within
the United States or its territories money originating from the estates of persong dying
within such foreign countries." Id. at 21-3. This requirement which the government
argued would cause embarrassment and engender countless reparation suits during wartime
because of a general international "freezing" of currency, has been stricken from the statute
by amendment. See note 3 supra.
30. See United States v. Rausher, 119 U. S. 407,419 (1886).
31. See Miller, Alien Land Laws (1939) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1.
32. The Alien Land Laws have, however, been unsuccessfully attacked in the past a5
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923);
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 313 (1923).
33. See Executive order No. 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended by Execu-
tive Order No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
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presented in the Be-ilacqua opinion, no interest ever vested in the widow and
children because of the condition precedent imposed by the statute as then
worded, which required the "heirs" to prove reciprocity before being en-
titled to take.3 4 Thus there never existed any alien property for the custo-
dian to seize. The California law has since been amended to create a re-
buttable presumption of reciprocity and to shift the burden of proof from
the non-resident foreign nationals to the contestant. 35 Presumably under
the new provisions, the property would pass to the alien heirs subject to
divestiture upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent, and the custodian
would be entitled to capture the interest. Only a misconception of the
respective functions of the custodian and the state legislature, or a denial
of the states' admitted authority to condition succession and testamentary
transfer, would lead to the conclusion that a reciprocity statute invaded the
federal sphere.
In Crowley v. Allen,36 however, a case later reversed for want of jurisdic-
tion, a federal district court had declared the California Statute invalid on
the grounds that Congress precluded state action when it passed the amended
Trading with the Enemy Act in 1941, giving the President and his designated
agents the broadest authority to control foreign funds and to sequester
alien property in wartime. Such a contention was denied in the Beuilacgya
case, the Court stating that to decide otherwise "would mean that upon
entry of the United States into a war, the normal powers of the state to
enact legislation admittedly within their powers in time of peace would be
automatically curtailed." 37 An even more valid argument is that a dear
purpose to occupy fully the field of alien inheritance rights during a period
of war should be required before imputing such intent to Congress, in view
of the historic reservation to the states of control of property ownership.1
Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision in Hines v. Davidowilz, cited
in the Crowley opinion, may be distinguished on the facts from the instant
cases. There a Pennsylvania alien registration law was struck down on the
theory that a similar national Act indicated that Congress intended to re-
serve the field to itself. The laws concerned, however, were largely coinci-
dent.40 A reciprocal inheritance statute regulates the conditions on which
the non-resident foreign nationals may acquire property; the Trading with
the Enemy Act applies to the seizure of property once acquired. No matter
how closely they may be related in actual operation, the functions and pur-
poses of each are distinct.
34. In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P. (2d) 589, 597-8 (Cal. App. 1945).
35. See note 3 supra. In Oregon, however, the burden of proof of recip&ocity is on the
non-resident alien. In re Braun's Estate, 161 Ore. 503, 90 P. (2d) 484 (1939).
36. 52 F. Supp. 850 (N. D. Cal. 1943); rev'd, Allen v. 'Markham, 147 F. (2d) 136
(C. C. A. 9th, 1945), Petition for certiorari granted by the United States Supreme Court,
sub nor. Markham v. Allen, 325 U. S. 846 (1945).
37. 161 P. (2d) 589, 597.
38. See (1944) 57 HAv. L. REv. 730-1.
39. 312 U. S. 52 (1941).
40. Id. at 61.
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST SALES OF NEW SECURITY ISSUES
PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE OF REGISTRATION STATEMENT"
SECTION 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ' prohibits the sale of new security
issues by underwriters or dealers prior to the date upon which a registration
statement, containing a detailed description of the issue, becomes effective.2
By means of Section 5, Congress established a "cooling period" I intended to
eliminate selling pressure upon investors before they could avail themselves
of the information concerning new issues required by the Act.4
However, because of the underwriters' continuous protests against legisla-
tive imposition of any "on the hook" period, during which they might have
to commit themselves to an issuer for securities they were not immediately
permitted to sell,6 the effectiveness of a "cooling period" has been largely
eliminated in a number of ways.
For example, the Commission may permit the filing of amendments to
deficient 6 registration statements to be "accelerated" and thereby avoid
* In the Matter of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3791,,
Feb. 28, 1946.
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1940)(hereinafter cited by section number
only). For the background of the Act and analyses of its provisions, see Douglas and Bates,
The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 171; Douglas and Bates, Som Effccls
of the Securities Act Upon Investment Banking (1933) 1 U. OF Cux. L. Prv. 283; Dodd,
Investor Protection by Administrative Agency (1942) 5 MoD. L. REV. 174.
2. Section 5(a) provides: "Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security,
it shall be unlawful for any pers8 n, directly or indirectly-(1) to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce to sell or offer to
buy such security through the use of any prospectus or otherwise; or (2) to carry or cause
to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of
transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale." Tie
Act's comprehensive definition of "sale" underscored Congress' intent to proscribe any
action which might align prospective purchasers before the effective date. Section 2 (3)
provides that the term "sale," "sell," "offer to sell," or "offer for sale" shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to dispose of, or a solicitation of an offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value; except that such terms shall not include
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any underwriter.
3. Section 8 (a) originally provided that the effective date of a registration would be
the twentieth day after the filing thereof. By an amendment to the Act, 54 STAT, 857,
15 U. S. C. § 77(h) (1940), the Commission may allow a registration to become effective on
an earlier date.
4. See H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 3, 7, 20.
5. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4314,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 165; Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H. R. 4344, H. R. 5065, and H. R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 138; Hlaven,
Investment Banking Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (1940) 9 MicH. Bus.
STUDIEs No. 3, 151.
6. A registration statement is deficient when its information is incomplete, inaccurate
or in anywise not in conformity with the Commission's requirements for full disclosure.
Thus if the price at which an issue is to be sold is not given in the registration statement, an
amendment to the statement would be necessary.
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postponement of the effective date of the statement 7 Accordingly, the sell-
ing price of an issue need not be decided upon until shortly before the end of
the cooling period, and underwriters usually do not, until then, make final
commitments to the issuer. If the final price amendment 8 is filed on the last
day of the cooling period and is accelerated by the Commission, the under-
writer may begin to dispose of the issue by forming a selling group or other-
wise disposing of the issue the following morning.9 Under these circum-
stances, the underwriter is actually committed to the issuer only for the
short period from the time he makes a final contract with the issuer to the
effective date of the registration statement, plus whatever time he may after-
wards require to dispose of the issue. Before the Commission permitted such
delay in the filing of final amendments, underwriters protected themselves
in their commitments to the issuer of new securities by including "market
out" clauses in their underwriting contracts. These clauses reserved to
underwriters the right to withdraw 10 during the waiting period if the market
situation changed. Finally, by a 1940 amendment to the Act," the Com-
mission was authorized to permit a registration statement to become effec-
tive less than twenty days after it is filed. 12 By thus reducing the period
during which an underwriter is committed before he may begin to dispose
of an issue, the Commissioner reduced pro tanto the time during which com-
plete disclosure is available to prospective buyers.
On the other hand, there is still available, from the date of filing the regis-
tration until its effective date, a substantial body of information to which,
if Section 5 were strictly observed, buyers would have access before selling
could commence. Unfortunately, however, the reluctance of many under-
writers and dealers to commit themselves without previous assurance of
their ability to sell at the determined price has found expression in the
7. Unless the Commission accelerates an amendment filed to complete or correct the
information required in a registration statement, the cooling period would begin to run
anew from the date such an amendment was filed. See Hearings before Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4344, H. R. 5065, and H. 1. 5833, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941) 46; House Committee Print, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
Proposals for Anendnents to te Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 4.
8. This amendment will also contain information concerning the spreads and under-
writing participations. See Gourrich, Inrestment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the
Securities Act of 1933 (1937) 4 LAw & CoNTEin,. PEon. 44, 65.
9. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4344,
H. R. 5065, and H. R. 5832, supra note 7, at 144.
10. For a discussion of this and other methods of avoiding liability in underwriting
contracts, see Lockwood and Anderson, Underwriting Contracts Within Purriew of Securities
Act of 1933; With Certain Suggested Provisions (1939) 8 GEO. \VAsa. L. REnv. 33,44; 2 DEV.-
IG, FINAxcIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1941) 1150 n. hh; Haven, supra note 5,
at 125.
11. See note 3 supra.
12. As an extreme example, the registration statement for the Kaiser-Frazer issue
became effective within three business days. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1945, p. 31, col. S.
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
practice of "beating the gun," that is, committing shares of a new issue for
sale prior to the effective date of registration. The Commission's failure to
act against this practice opened the possibility for distributions of new
issues prior to any adequate period during which even partial information
was available.
Despite the emphasis placed in the Act on the importance of disseminating
information during the cooling period to prospective purchasers, adequate
media for dissemination are not available at the present time. Although
the copious registration statement is available for inspection at the offices
of the Commission and copies are distributed upon request and payment,
few investors directly utilize this information in the appraisal of a new se-
curity. 3 It is true that Section 5 requires that on or after the effective date,
written offers to sell must be accompanied by a detailed prospectus.14 But
if the offer to sell is made orally, no prospectus need be supplied a purchaser
until the security is delivered. Hence, despite the disclosures demanded by
the Act, it is not certain that a buyer will by these methods receive any
direct information before the consummation of a sale. For a time the Com-
mission permitted underwriters to distribute the so-called "red-herring"
prospectus '5 during the cooling period subject to the limitation that the
prospectus not be used as an offer to sell. Unfortunately, the effective use of
this device was severely reduced by the Commission's subsequent require-
ment that distributors circularize all recipients with any amendments to the
original prospectus. Finally, there remains the customary method of dis-
seminating information through discussions between an underwriter and
dealer or between dealer and investor, which is apparently still in wide use
despite the stringent penalties imposed by Section 12 with respect to mis-
representations by sellers. 6 It should be realized that the two aims of pro-
hibiting solicitation and encouraging dissemination of information are not
wholly compatible; any dissemination of information by an underwriter or
* dealer, whether by "red herring" prospectus or word-of-mouth will in-
evitably be construed to some degree as a solicitation of an offer to buy.
17
The problem is to find a method which balances the two conflicting aims,
13. See 2 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1131; Gourrich, supra note 8, at 64.
14. Section 5(b). For the possible inadequacies of the statutory prospectus as a device
for disseminating information, see Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment
Banking Practices (1937) 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 72, 74.
15. See 2 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1133 n. k.; Hearings before Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4344, H. R. 5065, H. R. 5832, supra note 5, at 47.
The "red-herring" prospectus derived its name from the practice of printing across every
page in red letters a notice that the prospectus was not intended as an offer of the security
and calling attention to the Act's prohibitions against any offers before the effective date.
16. See 2 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 10, dt 1133 n. k; Kuhn, The Securities Act and its
Effect upon the Institutional Investor (1937) 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 80; Bates supra
note 14.
17. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4344,
H. R. 5065, and H. R. 5832, supra note 5, at 136-7; Bates, supra note 14, at 73; Bates,
The Waiting Period Under the Securities Act (1936) 15 HARV. Bus. REV. 203.
[Vol, 56
NOTES
In spite of the widespread practice among underwriters of making informal
commitments with dealers prior to the effective date of registration, the
Commission's recent proceeding, In the .lfatter of Van Alslyne, Noe &
Co.,' 8 constituted the first prosecution of an established underwriting firm
for violation of Section 5. The Van Alstyne firm, through a public state-
ment, asserted that the transactions for which it was penalized in this case
were merely in accordance with the usual practices of underwriting houses. 10
For purposes of the proceeding, however, the firm admitted the allegations
of the Commission and waived a hearing 0
The Commission found that in December of 1945 Van Alstyne, Noel &
Co. arranged with Andrew J. Higgins, president of Higgins Industries, Inc.
for the underwriting of 900,000 shares of common stock of the then unor-
ganized Higgins, Inc. Even before the registration statement was filed, the
underwriter arranged for full publicity to be given the proposed public dis-
tribution. This publicity was disseminated throughout the country by the
Dow-Jones financial ticker and in the newspapers. The firm then communi-
cated on a nationwide scale with other underwriters to inform them of the
proposed issue and to inquire whether they wished to participate in the
underwriting. 21 Upon completion of these conversations, the senior member
of the firm phoned Higgins that the underwriting was a success. Higgins
replied by letter that "the spectacular manner in which your company has
received oversubscriptions to the Higgins issue has upset the placidity of
New Orleans." 22 Shortly afterwards, the firm completed the formation of
the so-called underwriting group consisting of 74 other undenwriters and the
Van Alstyne firm which acted as syndicate manager for the marketing of
the 900,000 shares.23 As a result of communications between the Van Alstyne
firm and dealers, a selling group of 160 dealers was formed and allocated
18. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3791, Feb. 28, 1946.,
19. N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1946, p. 33, col. 3. It was alleged by Van Alstyne-Noel that
"our procedure was in all respects in line with our regular course of business and was, we
believe, the same procedure followed by substantially all other underwTiting houses doing
a similar business."
20. Van Alstyne-Noel issued a statement to newspapers maintaining that it had waived
a hearing in order to avoid delay for its client in the financing of the security issue involved.
See N. Y. Times, Mfar. 1, 1946, p. 28, col. 8.
21. Transactions of this nature do not usually violate the Act's prohibitions against
"selling" inasmuch as negotiations for the actual underwriting are excluded from the defini-
tion of "sale." See note 2 supra.
22. The letter also stated that "Fenner and Beane have advised their clientele that
their meagre allotment was sold out in a few minutes" and concluded with a request that
50,000 shares instead of 5,000 be allocated to that firm. In the matter of Van Alstyne-Noel
& Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3791, Feb. 28, 1946, p. 2.
23. Of the total 900,000 shares, 100,000 were reserved for Van Alstyne-Noel which re-
tained discretion to withhold any amount from each underwriter for the selling group. The
900,000 shares were to be sold at $10.10 per share to the undeniting syndicate members
who were, in turn, to offer them to the public at $11.00 per share. As syndicate manager,
the Van Alstyne firm was to receive 20 cents per share from each undeniter.
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specific amounts of stock. Dealers who had not been included in the selling
group contacted Van Alstyne-Noel and received allocations of 104,500
shares.24 Some of the dealers, in turn, allotted various amounts to their
customers. Similarly, the Van Alstyne firm received, through its own sales
department, numerous requests from public investors and entered for them
on its records "buy" order tickets aggregating 2,600 shares.
Following all these transactions, on January 30, 1946, a registration state-
ment was filed and had not yet become effective when, on February 6, the
Commission issued its order instituting proceedings. Upon the above find-
ings, the Commission concluded that there had been a "sale" by the under-
writer prior to the effective date of a registration statement and, hence, a
violation of Section 5(a)(1) of the Act. The penalty imposed by the Com-
mission resulted in the loss of profits to the firm of the Higgins underwrit-
ing 25 and a ten day suspension from the firm's normal operations.
The Commission's initial action against such practices has apparently
reduced the more flagrant manifestations of premature selling.2 Analysis
of the Van Alstyne ruling, nevertheless, reveals the continued need for clearer
definition by the Commission of its policy toward future enforcement of
cooling period restrictions. The underwriter's waiver of a hearing in this
proceeding enabled the Commission to rely on its own generalized allega-
tions that a selling group has been "formed" and shares "allocated." The
Commigsion's opinion does not disclose whether to "form" a selling group,
the underwriter must initiate conversations or need merely list dealers who
"communicate their interest" to him. Nor is it established that when cus-
tomers advise they "wish to be kept in mind," a dealer who commits this
notice to writing will be deemed to have "allocated" shares. The Commis-
sion also warned that the so-called underwriting group may have been so
large in relation to the size of the issue as to constitute in reality a selling
24. The Commission's ruling does not disclose whether these shares were withdrawn
from allotments previously made to members of the selling group or whether additional
shares were withheld from members of the underwriting syndicate.
25. Before the Commission made its findings, the Van Alstyne firm withdrew from the
Higgins underwriting and the syndicate was dissolved. Since the firm was to receive 90
cents per share on 100,000 shares to be sold its own customers and 20 cents per share on the
remaining 800,000, it thereby lost $250,000. The firm also lost the right to purchase at 10
cents each, some 100,000 stock purchase warrants which entitled the holder to purchase one
share of common stock at $11 per share up to January 31, 1951.
26. Although the firm's registration as a broker-dealer could have been revoked, the
Commission instead suspended the firm from membership in the National Association of
Security Dealers, Inc., for a period of ten days. This penalty barred Van Alstyne-Noel front
joining any underwriting group with other N.A.S.D. members. Nor can any member do
business with a non-member except on the same barsis as with the public. It is of interest to
note that State Senator David Van Alstyne, senior member of the firm, upon receiving word
that his company had been cited for investigation, withdrew as a candidate for the New
Jersey Republican nomination for governor. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1946, p. 18, col, 3.




group. But the ruling suggests no certain measure by which syndicate
managers must in the future guide themselves in limiting the size of the
syndicate.
Whatever stand may be taken concerning the rigidity with which restric-
tions against premature selling should be enforced, it is evident that effectu-
ation of the Act's intent to provide full disclosure before selling may legally
commence demands more effective dissemination of information. For ex-
ample, the usefulness of the "red-herring" prospectus in distributing informa-
tion may well outweigh its disadvantage as a medium of solicitation. An
unfortunate result of the VIan Alstyne ruling has been the virtual discon-
tinuance 21 by underwriters of the distribution of these preliminary pros-
pectuses. In recognition of the situation, the Commission has formulated a
proposed rule that would require underwriting managers to send "red-
herring" prospectuses to all potential selling groups before the offering date.
Supplements containing any necessary revisions would be appended at
offering time and copies of these would be sent to anyone previously in
receipt of the unrevised "red-herring." In order to protect the underwriter,
the rule would stipulate that the distribution of this prospectus would not
constitute premature solicitation.
In analyzing the possibilities of enforcing Section 5, a distinction should
be made between the problems posed by underwriters' premature sales to
dealers and those of dealers to the investing public. It is apparent that the
former lie within the scope of more practical enforcement. The large num-
ber of dealers and their use of means of communication other than the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce 0 make premature solicitations by
dealers difficult to control. In addition, an investor who has committed
himself to a dealer may feel free to withdraw should he change his mind after
receiving further information. A dealer who, under similar circumstances,
withdraws from his commitment to an underwriter does so at the probable
cost of participation in future issues. 0 Moreover, enforcement on the under-
writer-dealer level would reduce the pressure on dealers to solicit investors
as insurance for the disposal of already "purchased" shares.
It may be that the underwriting industry could not profitably function
under a rigid twenty-day cooling period of the type originally contemplated
by the 1933 Act. The Commission's policy of acceleration, apparently
28. N. Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1946, p. 21, col. 8. The underwriting industry appears co-
operative but its skepticism of the proposvals indicates that no extensive distribution of thece
preliminary prospectuses may be immediately expected. See Heffernen, Baners Weighing
.Proposals of SEC, N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1946, § 3, p. 1, col. 5. Although the first efforts along
the lines suggested by the Commission have already been made by two underwriting firms,
it is probable that full effectiveness of the plan will not be achieved until required by formal
rule. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1946, p. 35, col. 5.
,29. See note 2 supra.
30. H. R. REP. No. 85, op. cl. supra note 4, at 7-8. It is true, however, that all
"sales" made before the effective date can be of only a tentative nature and are legally unen-
forceable.
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adopted under this assumption, has permitted underwriters to reduce to the
vanishing point the period during which they need be committed for an issue
while unable to make legal offers of sale. 3' Under such conditions, even the
strictest enforcement of the restrictions upon selling prior to the effective
date would not require that underwriters commit themselves until just before
the end of the cooling period.32
At least until recently the surplus of investment funds has been so large
that full disclosure would not prejudice the immediate success of an issue.
The slower pace of new financing which has followed the sharp stock market
decline 33 indicates, however, that such conditions are abnormal and sug-
gests the wisdom of insuring that both dealers and investors have a maxi-
mum opportunity to avail themselves of the disclosures required by the
Securities Act before committing themselves to the purchase of new securi-
ties. It would therefore seem sound policy for the Commission, upon pro-
viding for more effective distribution of information, specifically to define
and proceed against underwriters' premature selling arrangements, no matter
how these may be hedged. 4
NON-COVERAGE AS A DEFENSE AGAINST JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS:t
To achieve a policy objective of optimum administrative efficiency con-
sonant with protection of individual rights,' the federal courts have tradi-
tionally refused to deny enforcement of an administrative subpoena duces
tecum except where the subpo6na is found to be arbitrary, unauthorized,
31. In the absence of acceleration the underwriters would presumably avoid firm com.
mitments for the entire period by the use of "market out" clauses.
32. If it is believed that complete information is not now available for a long enough
interval, the Commission might well consider a modification of its present policy of granting
acceleration to amendments filed on the last day of a cooling period. The Commission could,
for example, require that final amendments which contain sufficiently important informa-
tion be filed by at least the eighteenth day of the cooling period.
33. See Forrest, Stock Market Has Most Severe Break Since Start of Cash Trading,
N. Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1946, § 3, p. 1, col. 4; Heffernan, Vista Less Bright for New Issues,
N. Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1946, § 3, p. 1, col. S.
34. The Commission might, for example, promulgate specific rules for the types of
information it will permit sellers to distribute. Various letters or forms could be prescribed
and would, with the "red-herring" or other limited prospectuses, comprise the only ap-
proved media. All other methods would be deemed attempts to dispose of the issue involved
and therefore illegal.
* Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, News Printing Co. v. Walling, 66 Sup.
Ct. 494 (U. S. 1946).
1. ". . . [T]he basic compromise has been worked out in a manner to secure the
public interest and at the same time to guard the private ones affected against the only
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or unduly oppressive.2 Specific defenses uniformly recognized as available
upon order to show cause are that the information sought is irrelevant to a
proper subject of investigation,3 that enforcement would violate the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, 4 or that the subpoena is unreasonably vague,"
abuses from which protection rightfully may be claimed." Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 508 (U. S. 1946). The constitutionality of this enforcepent
procedure was established in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894), in which it was also
intimated that Congress could not constitutionally invest an administrative Agency with
power to punish for contempt. "Of course, the question of punishing the defendants for
contempt could not arise before the Commission; for, in a judicial sense, there is no such
thing as contempt of a subordinate administrative body. No question of contempt could
arise until the issue of law, in the Circuit Court, is determined adversely to the defendants
and they refuse to obey, not the order of the commission, but the final order of the court."
Id. at 488-9. Provisions for enforcement of administrative subpoenas by District Courts
have been included in many Congressional enactments; e.g., EMIERGENCY PICE CoNmoL
ACT OF 1942, 56 STAT. 30 (1942); FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 52 STAT. 1065 (1938),
29 U. S. C. § 209 (1940); Civ. AERONA TIcS ACT OF 1938,52 STAT. 1021 (1938), 49 U. S. C.
§ 644(c) (1940); FEDERAL POWER ACT, 49 STAT. 856 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825(0(c) (1940);
PUBLic UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935,49 STAT. 831 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 r (d)
(1940); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 161 (2) (1940);
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMISSION ACT OF 1934,48 STAT. 900 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78
u (c) (1940); SECURiTIES ACT OF 1933, 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 t (c) (1940);
FEDERAL TRADE COMMnISSION ACT, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 49, 50 (1940); I'rn-
STATE Cou1snRcn CovMssIoiN ACT, 25 ST..T. 859 (1889), 49 U. S. C. § 12(3) 1940.
2. The basic pattern of the defenses to an application for an enforcement order vwas
set in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894). "We do not overlook these constitutional limi-
tations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investiga-
tions conducted under the authority of Congress. ... It is scarcely necessary to say that
the power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce does not carry with it any
power to destroy or impair these guarantees .. . [A]s the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, by petition in a Circuit Court of the United States, seeks, upon grounds distinctly set
forth, an order to compel appellees to answer particular questions and to produce certain
books, papers, etc., in their possession, it was open to each of them to contend before that
court that he was protected by the Constitution from making answer to the questions pro-
pounded to him; or that he was not legally bound to produce the books, papers,,etc., ordered
to be produced; or that neither the questions propounded nor the books, papers, etc., called
for relate to the particular matter under investigation, nor to any matter which the Commis-
sion is entitled under the Constitution or laws to investigate." Id. at 478-9. Great emphasis
was placed, in the earlier cases, on the individual right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U. S. 298 (1924); Ellis v. ICC, 237 U. S. 434 (1915); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U. S. 407 (1903).
See notes 3-8 infra.
3. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924); Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co. v. NLRB, 122 F. (2d) 450, 136 A. L. R. 883, 890 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). The Administra-
tor's allegation concerning the relevance of the documents -ill probably be accorded a
great deal of weight by the District Court. Walling v. American Rolbal Corp., 135 F. (2d)
1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
4. See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 479 (1894); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616 (1886); Heller v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 446,448 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939). Contra:NLRB v.
Barrett Co., 120 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941). A corporation is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321
U. S. 707 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 375 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201
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not issued by a proper person, 6 technically defective,' or unauthorized by
statute.
8
Where, however, this last defense has been invoked on the ground that
the contestant was not within the jurisdiction of the agency, decisions have
conflicted as to the nature of the proof required to overcome the defense.
Although, in 1943, in Endicott Johnson v. Perkins,' the Supreme Court held
that the Administrator of the Walsh-Healy Act 10 could not be required
fully to prove "coverage" in seeking an enforcement order, the district and
circuit courts refused to forego entirely a preliminary examination of cover-
age." Instead, most of these courts insisted on a "reasonable showing" or
U. S. 43 (1906); Walling v. Golebiewski, 47 F. Supp. 448 (W. D. N. Y. 1942). This defense
is often eliminated by immunity provisions in the statute; e.g., EMiERGENCY PRICE CONTROL
ACT OF 1942, 56 STAT. 30 (1942); FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 52 STAT. 1065 (1938), 29
U. S. C. § 209 (1940); FEDERAL POWER ACT, 49 STAT. 858 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825 f (g)
(1940); PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COmPANY ACT OF 1935, 49 STAT. 832 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§ 79 r (e) (1940); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 456 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 161
(3) (1940); SEcuITIEs AND EXCHANGE Comiissi N ACT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 900 (1934),
15 U. S. C. § 78 u (d) (1940); FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION ACT, 38 STAT. 723 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 49 (1940).
5. Fleming v. Lowell Sun Co., 36 F. Supp. 320 (D. C. Mass. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 120 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941), a4f'd per curiam sub nor. Holland v. Lowell
Sun Co., 315 U. S. 784 (1942); see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 77 (1906); Bowles v. Aben-
droth, 151 F. (2d) 407, 408 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). But cf. Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 554 (1908); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F. (2d)
450 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
6. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357 (1942); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Fleming, 122 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), rev'd per curiam sub nonr Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 785 (1942); Lowell Sun Co. v. Fleming, 120 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A.
1st, 1941), aff'd per curiam sub nom Holland v. Lowell Sun Co., 315 U. S. 784 (1942),
7. But f. Bowles v. Bay of New York Coal and Supply Corp., 152 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A.
2d, 1945); Walling v. Golebiewski, 47 F. Supp. 448 (W. D. N. Y. 1942).
8. Ellis v. ICC, 237 U. S. 434 (1915); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U. S. 407 (1908); ICC v.
Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894); see FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924);
E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12, 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Bradley
Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 559 (1936).
". .. [N]o subpoena can be enforced . . . save by appeal to a court, which would then
and there refuse to sanction or aid any clear usurpation." 84 F. (2d) at 100; cf. Graham v.
Federal Tender Board No. 1, 118 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); United States v. Basic
Products Co., 260 Fed. 472 (W. D. Pa. 1919).
9. 317 U. S. 501 (1943).
10. 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 39 (1940).
11. The force of the Endicott decision was lost on some of the lower courts because of
dicta indicating that the decision was limited to the peculiar circumstances of the Walsh-
Healy Act. "It is not an Act of general applicability to industry. It applies only to con-
tractors who voluntarily enter into competition to obtain government business on terms of
which they are fairly forewarned by inclusion in the contract." Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U. S. 501, 507 (1943). See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F.
(2d) 658 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945), aff'd 66 Sup. Ct. 494 (U. S. 1946). "Endicott Johnson Corp,
v. Perkins . . . held that in the circumstances, the District Court should have enforced
the subpoena, but we do not understand that in so holding it intended to sweep away all
power of judicial discretion. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Walsh-Healy
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"probability" of coverage, 12 while the Third Circuit required merely allega-
tions showing reasonable grounds and authority for the investigation."3
Because of this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 14 in the
recent cases of Oklahonza Press Publishing Co. v. Walling and News Printing
Co. v. Walling.15 There, pursuant to section 9 of the Act,"; the Administrator
of the Fair Labor Standards Act had applied to District Courts in the Third
and Tenth Circuits for enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum requiring pro-
duction of certain books and records, including material which would enable
him to determine whether the firms were covered by the Act. Upon order
to show cause, the contestants claimed that since they came within the
exemptions specified in section 13,17 the subpoena was unauthorized, and
Act had peculiar application to those doing business by voluntary contract with the United
States Government. .. .." 147 F. (2d) at 660-1.
12. See Walling v. LaBelle S. S. Co., 148 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945); NLRB v.
Northern Trust Co., 148 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Mississippi Road Supply Co. v.
Walling, 136 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 752 (1943); Walling v.
Benson, 137 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 791 (1943); Martin
Typewriter Co. v. Walling, 135 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943); Walling v. Standard Dredg-
ing Corp., 132 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 761 (1943), rehearing
denied, 320 U. S. 810 (1943); cf. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 114 F. (2d) 384
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 690 (1940); Walling v. Belikoff, 6 Wage & Hour
Rep. 383 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); In re Walling, 6 Wages & Hour Rep. 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1943);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming, 122 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), rev'd per curiam on
other grounds sub norn Cildahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 785 (1942); SEC v. Tung
Corp., 32 F. Supp. 371 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
13. Walling v. News Printing Company, 148 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
14. 325 U. S. 845 (1945).
15. 66 Sup. Ct. 494 (U. S. 1946).
16. Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 722-3 (1914),
15 U. S. C. §§ 49, 50 (1940) were made applicable for purposes of hearing and investigation
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 STAT. 1065 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 209 (1940). Sec-
tion 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides "... . UiThe commission shall have
power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the produc-
tion of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation ... ilia
case of disobedience to a subpoena the commission may invoke the aid of any court of the
United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of documentary evidence. Any of the district courts of the United States within the juris-
diction of which such inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a
subpoena issued to any corporation or other person, issue an order requiring such corpora-
tion or other person to appear before the commission, or to produce documentary evidence
if so ordered, or to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey
such order of the court may be punished by such court as contempt thereof." 38 STvr". 722
(1914), 13 U. S. C. § 49 (1940).
17. The Oklahoma Press Publishing Company claimed that its employees were exempt
under section 13(a)(2) which provides exemptions to "any employee engaged in any retail
or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate com-
merce." 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 213(a)(2) (1940). The News Printing Company
relied on section 13 (a)(1) which exempts "any employee employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the capacity of outside sales-
man (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Administrator)." 52
STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 213 (a)(2) (1940).
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therefore invalid. On appeal from a denial of enforcement,18 the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on re-examination of the adminis-
trator's allegations and the affidavits submitted by the contestant, held
that a sufficient showing of "reasonable grounds for making the investiga-
tion" had been made out. 9 The Tenth Circuit Court, affirming a finding
for the Administrator after full adjudication below,"0 indicated that a show-
ing of "probable cause" would have been sufficient.21 The Supreme Court
affirmed both decisions in a single opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting.
2
Since the majority conceded that the allegations as to coverage which
were held a sufficient showing by the Third Circuit would not have estab-
lished "probable cause," as construed by the Tenth Circuit, 23 this latter
standard of proof was shown to be unnecessaryY.4 Furthermore, the opinion
emphasized that these allegations satisfied any possible constitutional re-
quirements as to the necessary showing. 25 Because, however, the affidavits
of the contestant were construed as showing coverage in fact,2" the case
cannot be considered a square holding that allegations purporting to show
coverage, are always a sufficient showing. Nevertheless, it may be fairly
inferred that the extensive discussion in the majority opinion will influence
the Circuit Courts to minimize the burden cast on the Administrator.
Subsequent to this decision, Congress passed the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 27 to "settle and regulate the field of Federal Administrative law
and procedure" 28 and to provide standards for judicial review. 21 Its broad
provisions are expressly designed to be read in connection with the particular
18. Application of Walling, 49 F. Supp. 659 (D. C. N. J. 1943) (refused to enforce the
subpoena).
19. Walling v. News Printing Company, 148 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
20. Walling v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 7 Wage and Hour Rep. (E. D. 0kla.
1944).
21. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
22. 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 510 (U. S. 1946).
23. Id. at 509, n. 53.
24. The court stated that the administrator's inquiry should not be "limited . . . by
... forecasts of the probable result of the investigation .... " Id. at 509.
25. "Congress has made no requirements in terms of any showing of 'probable cause';
and, in view of what has already been said, any possible constitutional requirement of that
sort was satisfied by the Administrator's showing in this case, including not only the allega-
tions concerning coverage, but also that he was proceeding with his investigation in accord.
ance with the mandate of Congress and that the records sought were relevant to that
purpose." Ibid.
26. "Actually . . . the showing here, including the facts supplied by the response was
sufficient to establish coverage itself, though that was not required." 66 Sup. Ct. at 509.
27. Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946), 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011
(July 1946 pamphlet).
28. SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 1. "Except in a few respects, this
is not a measure conferring administrative powers, but is one laying down definitions and
stating limitations." Id. at 31.
29. Id. at 7, 8. An analysis of the various types of provisions can be found at 8.
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statute under which the agency in question is functioning.-'O Section 6(b),
dealing with administrative investigations generally, reads in part: "[N]o
process, requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or
demand shall be issued, made, or enforced in any manner or for any purpose
except as authorized by law." 3' Section 6(c) refers to subpoenas specifically,
and states that "Upon contest the court shall sustain any such subpoena
. . . to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law. . ." 
'The precise effect of this Act on the existing legal status of non-coverage
as a defense is uncertain. Not only is the language of the applicable sections
vague, but examination of their legislative history does not provide any
definitive exposition of Congressional intent. Both the Senate Judiciary
Committee report 33 and a floor explanation 34 delivered by the chairman of
the House subcommittee 35 immediately before passage of the Act by the
House ' indicate a purpose to require some judicial scrutiny of the agency's
jurisdiction, but they conflict as to the scope of this inquiry. The Com-
mittee report, submitted prior to the Press Publishing decision but subse-
quent to the Endicott case, interpreted the Act as then drawn to require the
court to determine only "that the agency could possibly find that it has juris-
diction." 7 On the other hand, the floor explanation indicates that "cover-
age" must be fully proved as a condition precedent to enforcementCt The
30. "Nothing in this Act shall be held to . . .limit or repeal additional requirements
imposed by statute. .. ." Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) § 12,
5 U. S. C. A. § 1011 (July 1946 pamphlet). Note the references to statute in §§ 3 (c), S,
5(c), 9 (a), 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1002(c), 1004, 1006(c), 1009, 1009(a) (July 1946 pamphlet).
31. Pub. L. No. 404,79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) § 6 (b), 5 U.S. C. A. § 1005(b)
(July 1946 pamphlet).
32. Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) § 6(c). 5 U. S. C. A. § 1005(c)
(July 1946 pamphlet).
33. SEx. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945).
34. 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5757.
35. Representative Francis Walter of Pennsylvania.
36. 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5773.
37. "The subsection constitutes a statutory limitation upon the issuance or enforce-
ment of subboenas in excess of agency authority or jurisdiction. This does not mean, how-
ever, that courts should enter into a detailed examination of facts and issues which are
committed to agency authority in the first instance, but should, instead, inquire generally
into the legal and factual situation and be satisfied that the agency could possibly find that
it has jurisdiction." SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 20. See H. R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
38. "Where administrative subpoenas are contested, the court is to inquire into the
situation and issue an order of enforcement only so far as the subpoena is found to be in ac-
cordance with law. This is a definite statutory right and is applicable to subpoenas of every
kind addressed to any person under authority of any law. The effect of the subsection is
thus to do more than merely restate the existing constitutional safeguards which in some
cases, such as those involving public contractors--see Endicolt Johnson Corp. v. Perkins [317
U. S. 501, 507, 509,510 (1943)], have been held inapplicable. Also, the term 'in accordance
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weight of this latter statement is, however, diminished by the fact that it
was made after amendment had deleted from the bill all provisions specifi-
cally directing inquiry into jurisdiction." Furthermore, no mention was
made of the Press Publishling case which had recently been decided, although
the Endicott case was emphatically disapproved.
40
Whatever restrictions Congress or the Circuit Courts may have sought to
impose, a defense of non-coverage is subject to criticism where the agency is
granted investigative powers by its governing statute for the purpose of
ascertaining statutory violations. In issuing the subpoena, the Adminis-
trator is seeking to obtain information which is exclusively in the possession
of the contestant and which is essential to a determination of coverage. And
since an administrative finding of the factual basis for jurisdiction is an
essential part of a final administrative enforcement order,41 any initial
examination of the issue of coverage by a District Court constitutes inter-
ference with this fact-finding function, and cannot be reconciled with the
ban against preliminary injunctive attack on the agency's jurisdiction. 42
with law' does not mean that a subpoena is valid merely because issued with due formality.
It means that the legal situation, including the necessary facts, demonstrates that the
persons and subject matter to which the subpoena is directed are within the jurisdiction of
the agency which has issued the subpoena." 92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5757.
39. The bill as originally introduced stated: "§ 6 (B) . . .No process, requirement of
a report, demand for inspection, or other investigative Act or demand shall be enforcible
in any manner or for any purpose except (1) as expressly authorized by law (2) within the
jurisdiction of the agency . . .§ 6(c) . . . Upon any contest of the validity of a subpoena
or similar process or demand, the court shall determine all relevant questions of law raised
by the parties, including the authority or jurisdiction of the agency. . . ." Hearings before
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 112. The bill, as
reported by the Senate Committee on the judiciary stated, "§ 6(b) . . . Investigative
process is not to be issued or enforced except as authorized by law .... § 6(c) , . .Where
a party contests a subpoena, the court is to inquire into the situation and, so far as the sub-
poena is found in accordance with law, issue an order...." SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) 19, 20.
40. See note 38 supra. The author, apparently, was not aware of the Press Publishing
case which did not agree with his interpretation of the Endicofl case [see Press Publishing
case 66 Sup. Ct. at 506-7 and note 11 supra, and which held that no constitutional safeguards
would be violated by the refusal of the District Court to consider the jurisdi~tional issue.
Comments on the floor of the Senate are brief and unilluminating. 92 Cong. Rec., Mar. 12,
1946, at 2198. The Senate later, without debate, concurred in a House amendment to the
bill which did not change the language of section 6(b) or 6(c). 92 Cong. Rec., May 27,
1946, at 5921-4.
41. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). Cf. Southern Garment Manu-
facturers' Ass'n. v. Fleming, 122 F. (2d) 622 (App. D. C. 1941).
42. Newport News Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303,U. S. 41 (1938) "So to hold would . .. in effect substitute the District
Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress declared the Board
exclusively should hear and determine in the first instance. The contention is at war with
the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy is exhausted.
That rule has been repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is made that
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Furthermore, since an interlocutory appeal from a finding of coverage in the
administrative proceedings is not permitted,43 in order to avoid delaying the
investigation, a dilatory reviewable hearing at this stage would be anoma-
lous. Nor are all objections obviated by requiring merely a judicial determi-
nation of a "possibility" of jurisdiction.4" Seldom, if ever, will the face of
the pleadings reveal an absolute impossibility of coverage, 45 so that the de-
fense would in most cases be unsubstantial unless the introduction of further
evidence is permitted. This would afford an additional basis for time-
consuming hearings and appeals.
4
Moreover, denial of this defense would not result in undue prejudice to
individual rights, since the question of coverage may be judicially reviewed
after promulgation of an enforcement order.47 Nor, assuming lack of cover-
age, would the investigation be an illegal search and seizure, inasmuch as
the agency is proceeding pursuant to its delegated authority to determine
whether or not the particular statute is applicable.43 Furthermore, this
the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter." Id. at 50-1, and cases
cited at 51, n. 10; cf. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941); Federal Power Commission v.
Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 (1938).
43. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States,
307 U. S. 125 (1939); see Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YA LE
L. J. 539. See note 42 supra.
44. See note 37 supra.
45. In the Press Publishing case, the Administrator conceded that the subpoena should
not be enforced where an absolute impossibility of coverage appeared on the face of the
pleadings. "If the Administrator were to subpoena the records ofa business of a kind plainly
outside of the scope of the Act, such as that of the comer grocery store or the ordinary
farmer, the court would of course not be bound to accept the allegation that there were
reasonable grounds for an investigation. The Administrator should in that event be called
upon to make some additional showing to justify an investigation. . . . In such cases it
would appear upon the face of the pleadings that, absent some special circumstances, the
records were palpably irrelevant to any inquiry to ascertain violations of the Act." Brief for
L. Metcalfe Walling, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Depart-
meat of Labor, at 31-3, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 66 Sup. Ct. 494 (U. S.
1946).
46. Illustrations of the manner in which the proceedings can be delayed are to be found
in Sherwood, The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas (1944) 44 CoL. L. REv. 531 at
538, n. 25-7.
47. United States v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935); See Bradley
Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cerl. denicd, 299 U. S. 559 (1936).
The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "So far as necessary to decision and where
presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law. . . . It shall . . .
(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (3)
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations .... " Pub. L. No. 404, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) § 10(e), 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009(e) (July 1946 pamphlet).
48. A distinction appears to be drawn between jurisdiction and authority. A distinc-
tion which is logical in the light of the doctrine that findings of fact relative to coverage are
to be made, in the first instance, by the administrative agency. The agency, to perform
that function efficiently, must be given authority to investigate firms where statutory cover-
age cannot be determined in the absence of such an inquiry. This distinction appears to
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defense has no special value as a bar to harassment, since that danger is
present regardless whether the threatened individual is or is not subject to
the Act.49 A more effective plea would be that the investigation is not for a
purpose authorized by statute.50 Finally, the requirements imposed by uni-
form recognition of the remaining defenses to enforcement afford adequate
protection against other possible abuses of administrative power. 1
TAXATION OF NET PROFIT INTERESTS IN OIL PROPERTIES*
THE relative tax burden to be allotted parties to conveyances of oil prop-
erties depends primarily upon whether the transferor retains an "economic
interest in the oil in place." ' If a transferor divests himself of all "economic
interest," he pays capital gain rates 2 on any revenue returned to him. Such
income is ineligible for depletion deductions,3 inasmuch as these allowances
have been drawn in the Press Publishing case. "We think, therefore, that the Courts of
Appeals were correct in the view that Congress has authorized the Administrator, rather
than the District Courts in the first instance, to determine the question of coverage in the
preliminary investigation of possibly existing violations; in doing so to exercise his subpoena
power for securing evidence upon that question ... ." Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 66 Sup. Ct. 494 (U. S. 1946) at 508. "The result therefore sustains the Adminis-
trator's position that his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to
securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury's . . .and is
governed by the same limitations. These are that he shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of
his statutory authority, but this does not mean that his inquiry must be 'limited . . , by
... forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.'" Id. at 509. "All the records
sought were relevant to the authorized inquiry, the purpose of which was to determine two
issues, whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it.
These were subjects of investigation authorized by § 11(a), the latter expressly, the former
by necessary implication." Id. at 506.
49. But see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming, 122 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub non Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 785
(1942). "The motive of an administrative officer in undertaking lawful action within the
sphere of his valid powers and duties cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry."
122 F. (2d) at 1009.
50. See notes 8 and 48 supra. The evidence required to sustain this defense need not
and should not include evidence of coverage, or the lack of it.
51. See notes 3-8 supra.
* Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 326 U. S. 599 (1946); Burton-Sutton
Oil Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 66 Sup. Ct. 861 (U. S. 1946).
1. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551, 557 (1933). Because of the multiformity of oil
conveyances, identification of an "economic interest" has often proved difficult. See GLASS-
iaRE, LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES (1935); Rabkin and Johnson, The In.
come Tax Upon Oil and Gas Interests (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 383; Beveridge, The Fed-
eral Income Tax on Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases (1946) 34 CALIF. L. REv. 117.
2. For rules of computation see INr. REv. CODE §§ 111, 113(b) (1940).
3. Oil and gas reserves, like other mineral deposits, are recognized as wasting assets,
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are measured by the extent to which production consumes a capital asset
held by the taxpayer. As a corollary, the vendee-transferee is taxed on the
entire operating receipts, minus depletion. If, however, an "economic inter-
est" is retained by the transferor, revenue derived therefrom is a proper
subject for depletion by him, and is deductible from the taxable income of
the transferee. 4 Of the interests typically saved, an oil royalty, or perma-
nent right to participate in gross receipts, was the first deemed by the
courts to be an "economic interest." 5 Later, similar treatment was accorded
oil payments, i.e., predetermined amounts of oil or cash G paid out of pro-
duction.'
Two recent Supreme Court opinions, Kirby Petroleum Company v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue 8 and the subsequent case of Burton-Sutton Oil
Company, Incorporated v. Conmissioner of Internal Reenue, indicate that
henceforth depletion will also be allowed on reserved shares in net profits.10
In the Kirby case," an owner-lessor was allowed depletion on both an oil
royalty and a 20% share in net profits.1 2 The Commissioner had contended
that since the taxpayer's right to net profit payments was contingent upon
and thus depletion may be taken on income produced by their extraction. Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U. S. 404, 407-9 (1940). Depletion may be measured, at the option of the
taxpayer, on either a cost or a percentage basis. Ir. REV. CODE § 114(b)(1), (3) (1940).
The allowances must be "equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee." INT. REv.
CODE § 23(m) (1940). If depletion is taken on a percentage basis, the taxpayer may recover
taxfree, "27Y2 per centum of the gross income from the property during the taxable year,
excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred
by the taxpayer in respect of the property." Ir. REV. CODE § 114(b)(3)(1940). For criti-
cism of percentage depletion as too generous, see Comment (1943) 21 TEx. L. RElv. 410. For
the opposite view, see Id. at 798. The cost method of computing depletion is discussed in a
Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 466.
4. This income is excludible as rent or royalty within the meaning of § 114(b)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
5. See Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364 (1925); Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U. S. 103 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 (1933).
6. It is immaterial whether the payments are to be made in oil or in cash. Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U. S. 404, 412 (1940).
7. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U. S. 655 (1937). See Eaton, Taxation of Oil Payments
(1941) 19 TAXES 661.
8. 326 U. S. 599 (1946).
9. 66 Sup. Ct. 861 (U. S. 1946).
10. For an excellent article detailing the past confusion concerning taxation of such
interests, see Appleman, Taxation of Alet Profits from Oil and Gas Properties (1945) 23 TAxES
1009.
11. 326 U. S. 599 (1946), rev'g 148 F. (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945), rev'g 2 T. C. 125S
(1943). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. This case is discussed in Appleman,
An Analysis of the Kirby and Crawford Decisions (1946) 24 TAxEs 376; (1946) 20 TuLAxl
L. REv. 639. (Since the facts of the Kirby case are substantially the same as those in Co.,m'r
of Ynt. Rev. v. Crawford, with which it was consolidated, discussion vill be limited, for the
sake of convenience, to the Kirby case).
12. The Court also allowed depletion on a cash bonus received by the taxpayer on the
ground it was an advance royalty. See note 33 infra.
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
profitable marketing of tle oil, requisite interest in the oil in place was
lacking. 13 But the Court held the proper test was not whether an enforceable
right accrued directly upon severance, but whether the revenue to the trans-
feror was attributable solely to extraction and sale of the oil. 14 This result
appears sound, for the operator's function in paying marketing expenses
seems purely administrative. In other words, "net profits" here merely
signified that the transferor reserved 20% of the gross, less a like percentage
of production and marketing expenses.16
The scope of the Kirby decision is broadened by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Burton-Sutton Oil Company, Incorporated v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.16 There the taxpayer, an operating company which under-
took to return 50% of its net profits to its grantor, was permitted to exclude
this sum from its taxable income as rent, and, correlatively, depletion was
permitted the grantor. By so holding, the Court repudiated implications
of a dictum in the Kirby opinion 17 to the effect that a net profit interest,
absent an oil royalty, would not support depletion.'" Thus, a more realistic
13. This argument was accepted by the majority of the Fifth Circuit. Since this inter-
est was lacking, it reasoned, income from a net profit interest was payment of purchase price.
Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Kirby Petroleum Co., 148 F. (2d) 80, 82 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945), The
following cases, which were decided largely on this basis, are probably no longer law: Quin-
tana Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 143 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944); Blanken-
ship v. U. S., 95 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Euleon Jock Gracey, 5 T. C. 296 (1945).
Cf. Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 147 F. (2d) 962, 966 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945). In
1932, the Board of Tax Appeals allowed depletion on a net profit interest coupled with an
oil royalty. IV. S. Green, 26 B. T. A. 1017 (1932), which result was acquiesced in by the
Commissioner, XII-1 Cuxr. BuLL. 6 (1933). Ten years later, however, acquiescence was
revoked. 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 23.
14. Accord, Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 6 T. C. 172 (1946); William R. Murphy,
6 T. C. 294 (1946).
15. See the remarks of Circuit Judge Hutcheson in his dissent in the Kirby case, 148 F.
(2d) 80, 85 (1945). The same argument would seem equally forceful when applied to Burton.
Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., note 17 infra. In that case Mr. Justice Reed de-
scribed the "net" argeement as follows, "The contract between Gulf and Sutton required
the grantee-operator, who is now this taxpayer, to pay to the grantor, Gulf, 50%/o of the
proceeds of the oil produced and sold from the land, deducting from the proceeds certain
itemized expenses of the producer. Those expenses are so general in character that it may
be said fairly that Gulf was to receive 50% of the net from operations." 66 Sup. Ct. 861,
863 (U. S. 1946).
16. 66 Sup. Ct. 861 (U. S. 1946) rev'g, 150 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) aff'g., 3 T. C.
1187 (1944). Messrs. Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
a concurring opinion, expressing the view that the doctrine of Dobson v. Commissioner,
"lodging practical finality in a Tax Court decision unless it invokes a 'clear-cut mistake of
law,' "should have been applied in the instant case. 66 Sup. Ct. 861, 868 (U. S. 1946).
17. 326 U. S. 599, 604, n. 6 (1946); cf. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 40-1,409 (1910).
18. Since the original lessor retained an underlying royalty and the original lessee an
overriding royalty, one possible construction of the Burton-Sutton case is that it merely
reiterates the Kirby doctrine that depletion may be had on net profit interests coupled with
oil royalties. But the reservations of these prior parties seem not to have affected the
Court's holding, viz., "We do not agree with the Government that ownership of a royalty or
[Vol. 56
NOTES
tax apportionment is achieved, for the revenue at issue did in fact reflect re-
duction in value of the capital asset. Moreover, to allow a grantor who
enjoys 50% of the net income, capital gain rates thereon, while subjecting
the operator, who acts merely as a conduit for the payments, to higher rates
on 100%, would be most inequitable. A further extension of the Kirby
doctrine is the implied rejection in the Burton-Shilon decision of the former
practice of denying depletion to purported assignors. Although use of the
word "assignment" has sometimes relegated a transfer automatically to the
category of sale,' 9 the Court here rested its conclusion on the nature of the
transferor's share in receipts and the extent of his reversionary interest, -'
rather than on technical refinements of title.
21
It is clear, however, from the Court's failure to repudiate the prior land-
mark cases of Helvering v. O'Donnell 22 and Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land De-
velopment Company,23 that depletion deductions may still be unavailable
where a) the recipient is a stranger to the lease, or b) the conveyance is con-
strued as a sale. The former limitation is illustrated by the O'Donnell case,
where the taxpayer, who received a net profit interest as consideration for
other economic interest in addition to the right to net profits is essential to make the pos-
sessor of a right to a share of the net profit the owner of an economic interest in the oil in
place." Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 66 Sup. Ct. 861, 865 (U. S.
1946); cf. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Felix Oil Co., 144 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944) (omer-
lessor); A. B. Innis, 4 C. C. H. 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. Dec. 14, 667 (T C mem.) (sublessor).
19. Quintana Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 143 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 5th,
1944); Estate of Japhet, 3 T. C. 86 (1944); Marrs McLean, 41 B. T. A. 565 (1940) aff'd, 120
F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). The last named case seems a particularly graphic e.xample
of the use of words as formulae. See Appleman, supra note 11, at 1018-9.
20. The assignment w.as "made subject to the following conditions," among which
were: 1. The property was to revert in the event drilling was not begun within thirty days.
2. The lease was to be reassigned before its termination. 3. The "assignor" reserved an
option to purchase all oil "during the life of this agreement." 4. The "assignor" reserved a
right of entry upon the land to produce sulphur. The contract in issue is set out in detail in
Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc., 3 T. C. 1187, 1189-90 (1944); ef. Kirby Petroleum Co. v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 326 U. S. 599, 606 (1946); FelL Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 144 F.
(2d) 276 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); A. B. Ennis, 4 C. C. H. 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. Dec. 14, 667
(T C mem.).
21. While its applicability to assignments has heretofore been uncertain, this doctrine
is by no means novel as a general proposition. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404,411
(1940); qf. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 657,659 (1937) (assignor held to retain economic
interest even though the granting clause read, "We . . . do hereby bargain, sell, transfer,
assign, and convey all our rights, title, and interest in and to said leases and rights there-
under."). Courts early held that technical title to the oil in place was not necLssarily con-
trolling for tax purposes. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287
U. S. 551, 556-7 (1933); Alexander v. Continental Petroleum Co., 63 F. (2d) 927 (C. C. A.
10th, 1933).
22. 303 U. S. 370 (1938).
23. 303 U. S. 372 (1938). The Elbe and O'Doundl cases are discussed in a Comment
(1938) 51 HARv. L. RPv. 1424; Traynor, Tax Decisions of 11w Supreme Court, 1937 Trm
(1938) 33 ILL. L. Rv. 371, 392. For a view that the Fbe and O'Donnel cases are no longer
zood law, see (1946) 20 TuLAxE L. REv. 639, 644.
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the sale of his stock in a lessee corporation, was refused depletion on the
ground that, because of remoteness, he held a mere "economic advantage." 24
Similarly, depletion is withheld on percentage interests derived from pip-
ing 25 and other service contracts.26 One rationale advanced in these cases,
that the recipient has no right until after severance," is weakened by the
principal cases. Nevertheless, courts may continue to enforce this restriction
on the ground that a contrary ruling would aggravate the already burden-
some task of administering depletion.2
Although net profit payments were not directly at issue in the Elbe case,
that decision remains authority for the second qualification that retention
of a net profit interest does not affect an instrument otherwise a sale."
There depletion was denied on large sums of cash, payment of which by the
operator was a condition precedent to accrual of the transferor's net profit
right. In the light of the instant cases, however, the Elbe doctrine will prob-
ably be narrowly construed. Presumably, any instrument in which a naked
net profit interest is retained unconditionally will be treated as a lease.30
24. 303 U. S. 370, 372 (1938). See U. S. TREAs. REG. 111, § 29.23(m)-i (1943).
25. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362 (1938) rev'g., 90 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937); 47 YALE L. J. 278. The taxpayer, a contract purchaser of casinghead gas who
received a royalty share in exchange for piping services, was denied depletion.
26. Massey v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 143 F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) (attorney fee);
Schermerhorn Oil Corp., 46 B. T. A. 151 (1942) (geologist's services); Donald P. Oak, 46
B. T. A. 265 (1942) (acquisition of lease); North Range Min. Co., 46 B. T. A. 296 (1942)
(marketing services); A. B. Innis, 4 C. C. H. FED. TAX SERV. (Dec. 14 1945) 667 (TC mem.)
(assignment of option). The problem of differentiating between an "economic advantage"
and an "economic interest" is a difficult one. Drillers, equipment dealers, and investors who
provide capital or equipment for exploitation of the property are held to acquire an eco-
nomic and therefore depletable interest. G. C. M. 22730, 1941-1 Cusi. BULL. 214, 221. See
Hugh Hodges Drilling Co., 43 B. T. A. 1045, 1070 (1941) and cases cited there (drilling);
Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 102 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (financing);
Majestic Oil Corp., 42 B. T. A. 659 (1940) (financing). Courts sometimes treat such enter-
prises as joint ventures. See Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932).
Others find an agency relationship. See Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Caldwell Oil Corp., 141 F.
(2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
27. See Donald P. Oak, 46 B. T. A. 265, 273 (1942). Taxpayers whose interests are
derived from services rendered are held to have "a mere contractual right." Schermerhorn
Oil Corp., 46 B. T. A. 151, 159 (1942).
28. Depletion is allowed as a matter of grace. United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295,
303 (1927). Presumably, therefore, it may be limited to instances where no administrative
inconvenience results. See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938);
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362 (1938); Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F.
(2d) 324, 326 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
29. Factors supporting the position that the Elbe transfer contemplated a sale are:
1. The contract expressly stated the parties' intention to be that the grantor retain no inter-
est. 2. The cash payments were due absolutely. 3. The size ($2,000,000) of these payments
indicates they were the principal cofisideration for the transfer. 4. The grantor, which
operated the property prior to the transfer, sold its equipment together with the operating
privileges. 5. The property was to revert only in case of abandonment. Compare with the
provisions of the Burton-Sutlon transfer, supra note 21.
30. Theoretically, reservation of a naked net profit interest does not necessarily mark
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The kindred problem, however, of whether depletion will be allowed on a
cash bonus coupled with a net profit interest, remains unsettled. 31 Cash
bonuses, unlike oil payments, need not be measured by production and, in
fact, are often paid even before drilling is commenced. Nevertheless, when
joined with a permanent interest in gross receipts, they are depletable as
advance royalties.3 2 By eliminating the distinction between gross and net
shares, the Burton-Sutton decision presages similar treatment for cash
bonuses combined with net interests. While this extension is logically un-
objectionable, the entire practice of allowing depletion on these bonuses
seems anomalous, for although the government may recoup the allowances if
operation is not timely begun,33 these payments still reflect, at best, only
anticipatory production.34
Since depletion is permitted on advance cash bonuses, however, there
seems no basis for the present policy of withholding this privilege from either
gross or net oil interests secured by the personal credit of a grantee.35 While
income from an operator's pocket or from sale of the leases transferred : in
nowise consumes the capital asset, a transferor should not be penalized
where there is no resort to the guarantee, merely because payment may
come from a source other than extraction. Such unrealistic allocation of
depletion deductions can also work undue hardship on operators, who must
thus account for income they never enjoy.Y Moreover, the problem of
recoupment need not arise here, for depletion privileges can be withheld
until production is begun.
a transfer as a lease. It seems likely, however, that henceforth depletion .ill be allowed on
income from such interests, irrespective of the form of conveyance used. Cf. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 5 C. C. H. FED. TAX SERV. (Dec. 14 1945) 998 (TC mem.).
31. See Marrs McLean, 41 B. T. A. 565 (1940) af'd, 120 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941); Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Felix Oil Co., 144 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Blanken-
ship v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Appleman, supra note 12, at 379-
80. The provisions of oil conveyances are separable. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F.
(2d) 324, 327 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). In the Flenming case, the grantor reserved both a cash
bonus and an oil payment. The Court held income from the latter interest depletable, as
ordinary income from a lease, but held the bonus to be part of sale price, and therefore non-
depletable.
32. U. S. TREAS. REG. 111, § 29.23(m)-10(a) (1943). Cf. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S.
551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
33. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-10(c) (1943). See Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Sneed,
119 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
34. The payee of an advancie bonus is allowed depletion thereon, "but no deduction for
depletion by such payee shall be claimed or allowed in any subsequent year on account of
the extraction or removal in such year of any mineral so paid for in advance and for which
deduction has once been made." Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-10(b) (1943). See G. C. M.
22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932).
35. Blankenship v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Euleon Jock
Gracey 5 T.C. 296 (1945). Compare Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fleming, 82 F. (2d) 324, 327
(C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Gilcrease Oil Co., 6 T.C. 548 (1946).
36. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404,412 (1940).
37. See p. 173 supra.
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Although the distinctions between the transfers in the principal cases and
the Elbe and O'Donnell instruments may not be "held in the mind longer than
it takes to state them," '8 they are nonetheless valid. Considering the mani-
fold complexities of oil conveyances and the marginal nature of these cases,
the Court seems to have achieved a delicate balance betveen predictability
and flexibility.
ORIGIN OF THE PHRASE, "INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT IN
POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT AT OR AFTER'. . . DEATH"'
(SECTION 811(c), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE)
THE words "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after . . . death," appearing in Section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code and referring to gifts to be included in the value of the gross estate of a
decedent, may be traced to a Pennsylvania statute taxing collateral in-
heritances and enacted in 1826.1
This particular phrase appears to have no earlier antecedents, although
death duties were imposed in England as early as 1694.2 The Probate Duty
of that year, imposing a stamp tax on executors' and administrators' receipts,
was succeeded in 1780 by a Legacy Duty.3 The latter, at first merely a
replica of the old stamp tax, was subsequently revised to impose a duty on
personal property actually devised to legatees or passing by intestacy. 4
Between 1780 and 1815, nine revisions of the Legacy Duty I were made,
but neither these nor any of the previous statutes contained language akin
to the phrase under discussion.
The next relevant English statute, the Succession Duty, taxing the trans-
fer of interests in realty, was not enacted until 1853,6 twenty-seven years
after the passage of the Pennsylvania Act.
In this country, prior to 1826, Congress enacted a legacy tax 7 which was
38. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring specially in Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 66 Sup. Ct. 861, 868 (U. S. 1946).
1. Pa. Acts, 1825-6, c. 72, approved April 7, 1826. For a construction of this Act see
Reish, Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521 (1884).
2. 5 & 6 Wms. & MARY, c. 21; see Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,48 (1899).
3. 20 GEo. III, c. 28.
4. 36 Gao. III, c. 52 (1796); see HANSON, DEATH DUTIES (6th ed. 1920) 29.
5. 23 GEo. III, c. 58 (1783); 29 GEo. III, c. 51 (1789); 36 GEo. III, c. 52 (1796); 37
GEO. III, c. 135 (1797); 39 GEO. III, c. 73 (1799); 44 GEo. III, c. 98 (1804); 45 Gao. III,
c. 28 (1805); 48 GEo. III, c. 149 (1808); 55 GEo. III, C. 184 (1815); see HANSON, op. Cit, supra
note 4, at 46-7.
6. 16 & 17 VIcT., c. 51. This Act also taxed transfers of personal property not subject
to legacy duty but within the jurisdiction of British courts.
7. 1 STAT. 527 (1797).
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for the most part the same as the English Legacy Duty of 1780. The req-
uisite language is not therefore to be found in this federal statute.
Chapter 72 of the Pennsylvania Act provides in part:
"An Act Relating to Collateral Inheritances.
"Sect. 1. BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in GeneralAssembly
met and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That
from and after the first day of May next all estates, real, personal,
and mixed, of every kind whatsoever, passing from any person who
may die seized or possessed of such estate, being within this Com-
monwealth, either by will or under the intestate laws thereof, or
any part of such estate or estates or interest therein, transferred by
deed, grant, bargain or sale, made or intmnded to take effect, in
possession or enjoyment after the death, qf the grantor or bargainor to
any person or persons, or to bodies politic or corporate, in trust or
otherwise, other than to or for the use of father, mother, husband,
wife, children and lineal descendants born in lawful wedlock, shall
be and they are hereby made subject to a tax or duty of two dollars
and fifty cents on every hundred dollars of the clear value of such
estate or estates, and at and after the same rate for any less amount,
to be paid to the use of the Commonwealth, and all executors, and
administrators, and their sureties, shall only be discharged from
liability for the amount of any and all such duties on estates, the
settlement of which they may be charged with, by having paid the
same over for the use aforesaid, as hereinafter directed: prorided,
That no estate which may be valued at a less sum than two hun-
dred and fifty dollars shall be subject to the duty or tax." [Empha-
sis supplied.]
It will be noted that the only difference between the language in italics
above and the phrase appearing in Section 811(c) is the insertion in the
latter of the words "at or" and the slight changes necessitated by the omis-
sion of "of the grantor or bargainor."
Although no direct information is procurable as to the precise genesis of
the whole phrase, fairly sound conclusions may be drawn from the con-
temporary record of proceedings in the Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives. Under the date, March 20, 1826, the Journal of the House of Repre-
sentatives records:
"The bill No. 443, entitled 'An act relating to collateral inherit-
ances,' was read a second time. And the first section being under
consideration, a motion was made by Mr. Roberts and Mr. Clarke,
to amend the same by inserting after 'thereof' in the sixth line,
these words, 'or by deed, grant, bargain, or sale made, to take effect
after the death of the grantor or bargainor.' And on the question
"Will the House agree so to amend?
. [The question was determined in the negative."
"A motion was then made by Mr. Ellis and Mr. M'Reynolds to
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amend the section by striking therefrom these words 'estates real,
personal and mixed,' and inserting in lieu thereof these words,
'personal estates.'
"Which was disagreed to.
"A motion was then made by Mr. Petrikin and Mr. G. Bell, they
being in the majority, to reconsider the vote given on the amend-
ment, viz. to insert after 'thereof' in the 6th line of the first section,
these words, 'or by deed, grant, bargain or sale made, to take effect
-after the death of the grantor or bargainor.' And on the question
"Will the House agree to re-consider said vote?
".. So the question was determined in the affirmative.
"The amendment being again under consideration, a motion was
made by Mr. Petrikin and Mr. Roberts, to amend the same so as to
read as follows, viz. 'or any part of such estate or estates, or interest
therein transferred by deed, grant, bargain or sale made or in-
tended to take effect, in possession, after the death of the grantor or
bargainor.'
"Which was agreed to.
"And the 'amendment as amended was agreed to." I [Emphasis
supplied.]
After a discussion of several additional amendments not here relevant, the
Journal continues:
!'A motion was then made by Mr. Blythe and Mr. Adams, fur-
ther to amend the section, by inserting in the 6th line after 'posses-
sion,' the words, 'or enjoyment.'
"Which was agreed to." 9
The sequential addition of the words "intended," "possession" and "or
enjoyment" to the original phrase "to take effect after the death of the
grantor or bargainor" strongly indicates that the language as finally ap-
proved had no earlier origin.
Following the lead of Pennsylvania, Congress enacted in 1862 a tax on
legacies and distributive shares of personal property descending to col-
laterals.' 0
Section 111 of the act provides:
"AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That any person or
persons having in charge or trust, as administrators, executors, or
trustees of any legacies or distributive shares arising from per-
sonal property, of any kind whatsoever, where the whole amount
of such personal property, as aforesaid, shall exceed the sum of one
thousand dollars in actual value, passing from any person who may
die after the passage of this act possessed of such property, either
8. Journal of the Thirty-Sixth House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania (1825-6) 613-5.
9. Id. at 617.
10. 12 STAT. 432,485 (1863).
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by will or by the intestate laws of any State or Territory, or any
part of such property or interest therein, transferred by deed, grant,
bargain, sale, or gift, made or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment after the death of the grantor or bargainor, to any person or
persons, or to any body or bodies politic or corporate, in trust or
otherwise, shall be, and hereby are, made subject to a duty or tax,
to be paid to the United States, as follows, that is to say:" [Em-
phasis supplied.]
Precisely the same language occurs in Section 124 of the Revenue Act of
186411 and Section 29 of the War Revenue Act of 1898,'2 both of which
statutes similarly taxed legacies to collaterals.
The words "at or" occurring after "enjoyment" appeared for the first
time in the New York tax law of 1892, which imposed a tax on transfers of
personal property to near relatives as well as to collaterals. a3 Section 1
refers to transfers
".... made by a resident or by a non-resident, when such
non-resident's property is within this state, by deed, grant, bar-
gain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor,
vender or donor, or intended to take effect, in possession or enjoy-
ment, at or after such death." [Emphasis supplied.]
The added words were finally incorporated into the first federal estate
tax law, the Revenue Act of 1916, of which Section 202 provides in part for
gifts made
"in contemplation of or intended to take eflect in possession or en-
joyment at or after his [the decedent's] death. ,, 14 [Emphasis
supplied.]
This is the exact statutory language employed in Section 811(c) of the
present Internal Revenue Code.
In conclusion, mention may be made of the fact that substantially the
same over-all language appearing in Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Statute
of 1826 was employed in the New York Collateral Inheritance Tax Law of
1885.15 It persisted until 1892, unchanged by the amendments of 1887 Is
and 1891,'7 except for the inclusion in the latter of the words "in contempla-
tion of death."
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